Topics in Economic Theory, Spring 1999
Ariel Rubinstein
Meetings
| # | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 
| Starting Date | 15/4 | 22/4 | 27/5 | 10/6 | 24/6 | 1/7 | 8/7 | 29/7 | 
| Presenter | Yoram | Rani | Oren | Michal | Michael | Tali | Sigal | Kfir | 
| Topic # | 3 | 4 | 8 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 7 | 5 | 
| Topic | Evolution | Self Control | Random dictator | Psy | Salience | Poaching | Core | Contracts | 
Participants:
| Name | |
| Oren Bar-Gill | bargill@bigfoot.com | 
| Kfir Eliaz | kfir@post.tau.ac.il | 
| Yoram Hamo | yoram@econ.tau.ac.il | 
| Eran Hanany | hananye@post.tau.ac.il | 
| Michal Ilan | michalil@netvision.net.il | 
| Sigal Leviatan | sigall@math.tau.ac.il | 
| Michael Ornstein | ornstein@econ.tau.ac.il | 
| Tali Regev | morphil@netvision.net.il | 
| Ran Spiegler | rani@econ.tau.ac.il | 
Topics
| Number | Topic | Description | References | 
| 1 | Framing and Salience
       
 
  | 
    Bacharach is a very interesting scholar who has interesting ideas about
      the origin of salient behavior. We will survey some of his papers on the
      subject and discuss it.
       
  | 
    Bacharacah, M. "Cooperation without Communication", 1995.
       Bacharacah, M. "Variable-frame Level-N theory", 1997 Bacharacah, M. "We Equilibria: A variable Frame Theory of cooperation", 1997.  | 
  
| 2 | Psychology and Games
       
 
  | 
    To examine this growing field we will read and discuss two works  The
      first is a survey and a second is a representative of the work in the filed
       
  | 
    Rabin, M. "Psychology and Economics", J.Econ.Lit, 36 (1998), 11-46.
       Rabin, M. and Schrag "First Impressions Matter: A model of Confirmatory Bias", QJE, 94 (1999), 37-82. http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~rabin/wpapers2.html  | 
  
| 3 | Evolution
       
  | 
    To see what is new in this area we will read a paper by one of the
      more original contributors of the field:
       
  | 
    Robson, A. "The Evolution of Intelligence and the red Queen", 1999. | 
| 4 | Dynamic Inconsistency and Self control
       
  | 
    We will examine methodologically an interesting (and not trivial) paper:
       
  | 
    Gul, F. and W.Pesendorfer "Dynamic Inconsistency and Self Control", 1998. | 
| 5 | Incomplete contracts
       
  | 
    Where do we stand in this area?
       
 
  | 
    Tirole, J. "Incomplete Contracts: where do we stand?", 1998
       Maskin, E. and J. Tirole "Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts", 1998. Segal, E. Find: in my office  | 
  
| 6 | Customer Poaching
       
 
  | 
    It is not just a matter of IO....
       
  | 
    Fudenberg, D. and J.Tirole "Customer Poaching and Brand Switching", 1997. | 
| 7 | The assignment Core
       
  | 
    A classical work which is still a mine for ideas:
       
  | 
    Shapley, L. and M. Shubik "The Assignment Game I: The Core", Int J. game
      Theory 2(1972), 111-130.
       
  | 
  
| 8 | Random Dictator
       
  | 
    Why do we have an intuition that a random dictator is not such a great
      idea?
       We will discuss the axiomatizaions of the idea and conduct a free discussion.  | 
    Barbera, S. "Majority and Positional Voting in a probabilistic Framework",
      RES 46 (1979), 379-389
       and the references there (especially Gibbard's paper)  |