Problem Set 5– Demand: Consumer Choice

Problem 1.

Verify that when preferences are continuous, the demand function x(p,w) is continuous in prices and in wealth (and not only in *p*).

Let $\{(p^n, w^n)\}$ converge to (p, w). Since x(p, w) is homogeneous of degree zero, then

$$x(p^n,w^n)=x(\frac{p^n}{w^n},1).$$

Since demand is continuous in *p*, then

$$x(\frac{p^n}{w^n},1) \to x(\frac{p}{w},1) = x(p,w),$$

where the equality follows from x(p, w) being homogeneous of degree zero.

Problem 2.

Show that if a consumer has a homothetic preference relation, then his demand function is homogeneous of degree one in *w*.

Let $\lambda > 0$ and $y \in B(p, \lambda w)$. Then $y/\lambda \in B(p, w)$. Since $x(p, w) \succeq y/\lambda$ and preferences are homothetic, then $\lambda x(p, w) \succeq y$, and thus, $\lambda x(p, w)$ is the best element in $B(p, \lambda w)$, that is $x(p, \lambda w) = \lambda x(p, w)$.

Problem 3.

Consider a consumer in a world with K = 2, who has a preference relation that is monotonic, continuous, strictly convex, and quasi-linear in the first commodity. How does the demand for the first commodity change with w?

Claim: For any *p* either there is no *w* such that $x_1(p,w) > 0$ or there exists an $w^* \ge 0$ such that if $w \le w^*$, then the consumer does not consume the first commodity, and if $w \ge w^*$, then the first commodity absorbs all changes in wealth, that is $x_1(p,w) = \frac{w-w^*}{p_1}$.

Proof: Normalize $p_1 = 1$. First, we show if $x_1(p, w) = 0$, then $x_1(p, w') = 0$ for $w' \le w$. Let $w' \le w$. Denote $a = (0, w'/p_2)$, $b \in B(p, w')$ such that pb = w', $c = (a_1 + (w - w'), a_2)$, $d = (b_1 + (w - w'), b_2)$ and $e = (0, w/p_2)$.

Note that pd = w and c is between e and d. Since $e \succeq d$ then $c \succeq d$. By the quasi-linearity $a \succeq b$. Therefore $x(p, w') = a = (0, w'/p_2)$.



Now, if there is *w* such that $x_1(p,w) > 0$ then by continuity of the demand function $w^* = \max\{w \mid x_1(p,w) = 0\}$ exists. We need to show that $x(p,w) = (w - w^*, w^*/p_2)$ for all $w \ge w^*$. If $x_2(p,w) > w^*/p_2$, for some $w > w^*$, let a = x(p,w) and by the quasi linearity in the first commodity $b = (0,a_2) \succeq y$ for all $y \in B(p,p_2x_2(p,w))$ contradicting the definition of w^* (see graph). If $x_2(p,w) < w^*/p_2$, for some $w > w^*$, then c = x(p,w) and

 $d = (x_1(p, w) - (w - w^*), x_2(p, w)) \gtrsim e = (0, w^*/p_2)$, a contradiction to the definition of w^* .



Problem 4.

Let \succeq be a continuous preference relation (not necessarily strictly convex) and w a number. Consider the set $G = \{(p,x) \in \Re_{++}^K \times \Re_+^K \mid x \text{ is optimal in } B(p,w)\}$. (For some price vectors, there could be more than one $(p,x) \in G$.) Calculate G for the case of K = 2 and preferences represented by $x_1 + x_2$.

Show that for any preference relation, *G* is a closed set.

If preferences are represented by $x_1 + x_2$, then the consumer will buy the cheapest good. Therefore, *G* is the set

 $\{(p, (0, w/p_2))|p_2 < p_1\} \cup \{(p, (w/p_1, 0))|p_1 < p_2\} \cup \{(p, (\alpha, w/p_2 - \alpha))|p_2 = p_1, \alpha \in [0, w/p_1]\}.$ Let (p^n, x^n) be a sequence of points in *G* converging to (p, x). Then $p^n x^n \le w$ for every *n*, and thus $px = \lim_{n \to \infty} p^n x^n \le w$, i.e. $x \in B(p, w)$.

If *x* is not optimal in B(p, w), then there exists a $y \in B(p, w)$ such that $y \succ x$. By continuity, there exists an $\epsilon > 0$ such that $Ball(y, \varepsilon) \succ Ball(x, \varepsilon)$, and thus there exists a bundle $z \in Ball(y, \varepsilon)$ such that pz < w and $z \succ x$. Since $p^n \rightarrow p$, then $p^n z \le w$ for *n* large. Since $x^n \rightarrow x$, then $x^n \in Ball(x, \varepsilon)$ for *n* large, and thus $z \succ x^n$, a contradiction to x^n be optimal in $B(p^n, w)$.

Problem 5.

Determine whether the following consumer behavior patterns are fully rationalized (assume K=2):

a. The consumer's demand function is $x(p,w) = (2w/(2p_1 + p_2), w/(2p_1 + p_2))$.

Yes. x(p,w) is rationalized by the monotonic preferences represented by $u(x) = \min\{x_1, 2x_2\}$.

b. The consumer consumes up to quantity 1 of commodity 1 and spends his excess wealth on commodity 2.

Yes. x(p, w) is rationalized by the monotonic preferences represented by

$$u(x) = \begin{cases} x_1 & \text{if } x_1 < 1\\ 1 + x_2 & \text{if } x_1 \ge 1 \end{cases}$$

c. The consumer chooses the bundle (x_1, x_2) which satisfies $\frac{x_1}{x_2} = \frac{p_1}{p_2}$ and costs *w*. (Does the utility function $u(x) = x_1^2 + x_2^2$ rationalize the consumer's behavior?)

No. The behavior violates the WA. x((2,1),5) = (2,1) and x((1,2),5) = (1,2). Both bundles are affordable in both budget sets.

The function $u(x) = x_1^2 + x_2^2$ does not rationalize x(p, w) since a consumer maximizing u would allocate all wealth to the cheapest good. The "first order condition" approach is not appropriate because preferences represented by u are not convex.

Problem 6.

In this question, we consider a consumer who behaves differently from the classic consumer we talked about in the lecture. Once again we consider a world with K commodities. The consumer's choice will be from budget sets. The consumer has in mind a preference relation that satisfies continuity, monotonicity, and strict convexity; for simplicity, assume it is represented by a utility function u.

The consumer maximizes utility up to utility level u^0 . If the budget set allows him to obtain this level of utility, he chooses the bundle in the budget set with the highest quantity of commodity 1 subject to the constraint that his utility is at least u^0 .

a. Formulate the consumer's problem.

$$\max_{x \in B(p,w)} u(x) \quad \text{if } \max_{x \in B(p,w)} u(x) < u^0, \text{ and} \\ \max_{x \in B(p,w)} x_1 \quad \text{ s.t. } u(x) \ge u^0 \quad \text{if } \max_{x \in B(p,w)} u(x) \ge u^0.$$

b. Show that the consumer's procedure yields a unique bundle.

If $\max_{x \in B(p,w)} u(x) < u^0$, then the consumer acts as in the standard framework. x(p,w) exists because preferences are continuous and is unique because preferences are strictly convex.

If $\max_{x \in B(p,w)} u(x) \ge u^0$, define $\tilde{B} = \{x \in B(p,w) \mid u(x) \ge u^0\}$, which is compact, and convex (by strict convexity). Then $\max_{x \in \tilde{B}} x_1$ exists. If both *y* and *z* are solutions then by the strict convexity $u((y + z)/2) > u_0$ and thus there is a vector *x* such that $u(x) > u^0$ and $x_1 > y_1$ contradicting the optimality of *y* in \tilde{B} .

c. Is this demand procedure rationalizable?

Yes. The procedure is rationalized by

$$v(x) = \begin{cases} u(x) & \text{if } u(x) < u^{0} \\ u^{0} + x_{1} & \text{if } u(x) \ge u^{0} \end{cases}$$

d. Does the demand function satisfy Walras Law?

Yes. Preferences are monotonic.

e. Show that in the domain of (p, w) for which there is a feasible bundle yielding utility of at least u^0 the consumer's demand function for commodity 1 is decreasing in p_1 and increasing in w.

In both cases the budget set is enlarging and the consumer could obtain more x_1 and preserve u^0 .

f. Is the demand function continuous?

Yes.

Let z(p,w) be the solution of $\max_{x \in B(p,w)} u(x)$. Note that in this case z(p,w) is not necessarily the consumer's demand x(p,w).

First, we show that demand is continuous in prices. Let $\{p^n\}$ converge to p. If $u(z(p,w)) < u^0$ then for n large enough $max_{x \in B(p^n,w)}u(x) < u^0$ and the demand is $z(p^n,w)$ converges to z(p,w) which is the demand in (p,w).

Assume $u(z(p,w)) \ge u^0$. Let $m = \inf_{i,n} p_i^n > 0$, the infimum of the commodity prices. Then $x(p^n,w) \in [0,w/m]^K$ for all n, and thus WLOG we can assume that $x(p^n,w)$ converges to a bundle y. By contradiction, assume that $y \neq x(p,w)$.

If $u(y) < u^0$, then by continuity, there exists an $\epsilon > 0$ such that $Ball(x(p,w), \epsilon) > Ball(y, \epsilon)$. Then, there exists a $a \in Ball(x(p,w), \epsilon)$ such that pa < w and a > y. For *n* large, $p^n a \le w$ and $a > x(p^n, w)$, a contradiction.

If $u(y) \ge u^0$, then $x_1(p,w) > y_1$. Let $a = \frac{1}{2}x(p,w) + \frac{1}{2}y$. Then $a_1 > y_1$, $a \in B(p,w)$ and $u(a) > u^0$ by strict convexity. By continuity, there exists an $\epsilon > 0$ small such that $a_1 - \epsilon > y_1 + \epsilon$, $p \cdot (a - \epsilon e_1) < w$ and $u(a - \epsilon e_1) \ge u^0$. Thus for *n* large, $B(p_n,w)$ contains $a - \epsilon e_1$ which yields utility larger than u^0 and quantity larger than $x_1(p^n,w)$, a contradiction.

Now, let $\{(p^n, w^n)\}$ converge to (p, w). Since x(p, w) is homogeneous of degree zero, then

$$x(p^n,w^n)=x(\frac{p^n}{w^n},1).$$

Since demand is continuous in *p*, then

$$x(\frac{p^n}{w^n},1) \to x(\frac{p}{w},1) = x(p,w),$$

where the equality follows from x(p, w) being homogeneous of degree zero.

Problem 7.

It's a common practice in economics to view aggregate demand as being derived from the behavior of a "representative consumer". Give two examples of "well-behaved" consumer preference relations that can induce average behavior that is not consistent with maximization by a "representative consumer". (That is, construct two "consumers", 1 and 2, who choose the bundles x^1 and x^2 out of the budget set *A* and the bundles y^1 and y^2 out of the budget set *B* so that the choice of the bundle $\frac{x^1+x^2}{2}$ from *A* and of the bundle $\frac{y^1+y^2}{2}$ from *B* is inconsistent with the model of the rational consumer).

Let
$$(p^A, w^A) = ((1, 2), 8), (p^B, w^B) = ((2, 1), 8)$$
 and

$$u_1(x) = \begin{cases} x_1 & \text{if } x_1 < 4\\ 4 + x_2 & \text{if } x_1 \ge 4 \end{cases} \qquad u_2(x) = \begin{cases} x_2 & \text{if } x_2 < 4\\ 4 + x_1 & \text{if } x_2 \ge 4 \end{cases}$$

The demands of the two agents in *A* will be (4,2) and (0,4) and thus $\overline{x^A}(p,w) = (2,3)$. Similarly, $\overline{x^B}(p,w) = (3,2)$. Both average bundles are interior in *A* and in *B*. Thus, we the average demand violates the weak axiom.

Problem 8.

A commodity k is Giffen if the demand for the k'th good is increasing in p_k . A commodity k is inferior if the demand for the commodity decreases with wealth. Show that if there is a vector (p, w) such that the demand for the k'th commodity is rising after its price has increased, then there is a vector (p', w') such that the demand of the k'th commodity is falling after the income has increased (Giffen implies inferior).

Let e_k be the vector with the *k*'th component being 1 and all other components being 0. We have $x_k(p + \epsilon e_k, w) > x_k(p, w)$. Let $w' \ge w$ be the "compensating" wealth level, that is $[p + \epsilon e_k] \cdot x(p, w) = w'$. Thus, $x(p + \epsilon e_k, w') \succeq x(p, w)$. By definition,

 $px(p + \epsilon e_k, w') + \epsilon x_k(p + \epsilon e_k, w') = [p + \epsilon e_k] \cdot x(p + \epsilon e_k, w') \le w' = w + \epsilon x_k(p, w).$

If $x_k(p + \epsilon e_k, w') > x_k(p, w)$ then $px(p + \epsilon e_k, w') < w$ contradicting the optimality of x(p, w) in B(p, w).

