TAM V'KIMAAT NISHLAM. HAG SAMEACH
|
red=planned lectures purple=vacation green=will be rescheduled s=strike |
| Lecturer | Ariel Rubinstein
|
|||||||||
| Teaching Assistants | The teaching assistants will hold two separate sessions where they will go through the problem sets. You will be asked to attend one of the two classes. | |||||||||
| Problem Sets | It is extremely important that you submit all problem sets even though it is not a mandatory requirement. | |||||||||
| Administrative problems | Anna
Ayach |
|||||||||
| Date |
|
|||||||||
| Books |
|
|||||||||
| Course Material | A student is required to hold an e-mail
address . All material for the course will be posted on the web (and
will not be distributed in class).
Downloading lecture notes and problems sets requires a "user name" and a password which will be given to students in the class and should not be transferred to other students!! |
|||||||||
| Exam | June 10 | |||||||||
| Students list | For registration send an e-mail to listserv@post.tau.ac.il with the line: subscribe eco1011-4101-01@listserv.tau.ac.il Real Name |
Plan of the course
In most of the course (about 2/3 we study game theory. In the rest of the course we will discuss economics of information.
| # | Date | Topic | Lecture
Notes |
Solution
|
| 1 | 21/2 | Strategic Reasoning | G01 | sol |
| 2 | 23/2 | Nash Equilibrium | ||
| 3 | 28/2 | Zero Sum Games | G02 | sol |
| 4 | 2/3 | Bayesian Games | G03 | sol |
| 5 | 7/3 | Bayesian Games-examples | ||
| 6 | 9/3 | Mixed startegies | G04 | sol |
| 7 | 11/3 | The Jury Example | ||
| 8 | 14/3 | Correlated Equilibrium | ||
| 9 | 30/3 | Rationalizability | G05 | sol |
| 10 | 4/4 | Extensive Game | G06 | sol |
| 11 | 6/4 | Subgame Prefect Equilibrium | ||
| 12 | 8/4 | Subgame Prefect Equilibrium | ||
| 13 | 11/4 | Bargaining | G08 | sol |
| 14 | 13/4 | Bargaining | ||
| 15 | 15/4 | Forward Induction | G07 | sol |
| 16 | 18/4 | Repeated Games | ||
| 17 | 20/4 | Repeated Games | ||
| 18 | 16/5 | Repeated Games | problem set 9 | sol |
| 19 | 18/5 | Incomeplete Information | ||
| 20 | 23/5 | Incomeplete Information | problem set 10 | sol |
| 21 | 25/5 | Sequential equilibrium | ||
| 22 | 30/5 | SPB equilibrium | ||
| 23 | 1/6 | Signalling Model | problem set 11 | sol |
Special tasks
| Before Lecture | Task | Links |