(vitae: updated  April 24th, 2024)

Ariel Rubinstein

School of Economics , Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel 69978

Department of EconomicsNew York University, New York, NY, 10012, USA


+972-54-423-5347 (Israel) 

+1-917-412-5844 (USA)

e-contact e-mail:  rariel@tauex.tau.ac.il   skype:  arielrubinstein Whatsapp:+972544235347
Homepage https://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/
Birth Jerusalem  13/4/1951
Citizenship Israel

The Hebrew University, 1972-1979:
1974: B.Sc. Mathematics, Economics and Statistics
1975: M.A. Economics (supervisor: Menahem Yaari)
1976: M.Sc Mathematics (supervisor: Bezalel Peleg)
1979: Ph.D. Economics (supervisor: Menahem Yaari)

Permanent Employment:

The Hebrew University (Department of Economics):
Senior Lecturer, October 1981
Associate Professor, October 1984
Professor, October 1986-March 1990.
Tel Aviv University (Department of Economics):
Professor, April 1990 - September 2019
Salzberg Chair, May 1990- September 2019
Chairperson, July 1991-May 1993.
Princeton University (Department of Economics):
Lecturer in Rank of Professor, 1991-2004
New York University (Department of Economics)
Professor, September 2004-


Rothschild Fellow: 1979
Fellow of The Econometric Society: 1985 (executive committee 1994-7)
Foreign honorary member of The American Academy of Arts and Sciences: 1994
Foreign honorary member of The American Economic Association: 1995
Fellow of The Israeli Academy of Sciences: 1995
The Michael Bruno memorial award: 2000
Israel Prize: 2002
Doctor Honorees Causa of Tilburg University: 2002
Honorary Fellow, Nuffield College, Oxford: 2002 
President of The Econometric Society: 2004  (presidential report)
Member, European Academy of Sciences and Arts: 2004
Nemmers Prize, Northwestern University: 2004
Fellow, European Economic Association: 2004
The EMET Prize: 2006
Elected Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy: 2007
Rothschild Prize: 2010
Economic Theory Fellow: 2011
Fue diversity Prize: 2012
Member, Academia Europaea: 2012
Fellow of the Game Theory Society: 2017
Clarivate Analytics Citation Laureate: 2019


Econometrica: Associate Editor, 1984-1992.
Journal of Economic Theory: Associate Editor, 1986-1994.
Review of Economic Studies: Member of editorial board, 1987-1988; Foreign Editor, 1988-1992
Games and Economic Behavior: Associate Editor, 1988-2002 (A letter of resignation from the GT Society)
Review of Economic Design: Member of editorial board, 1993-2007. Advisory Board, 2015-
Mathematics of Social Sciences: Associate editor, 1993-2001
International Journal of Game Theory: Member of editorial board, 1995-2000
NAJ Economics: Member of editorial board, 2001-2007
AEJ Micro: Board of Editors, 2010-2016
Journal of European Economic Association: Advisory Committee, 2003-
Theoretical Economics: Executive Board, 2005- 2009, Associate editor, 2010-
Economics and Philosophy: Member of editorial board, 1994-2014, 2016-

Named Lectures:

1. The Pazner Lecture, Tel-Aviv, 1982.
2. The Walras-Bowley Lecture, The Econometric Society Meeting, Minnesota, 1988.
3. Hooker Lectures, McMaster University, Canada, 1992.
4. The CORE Lectures, Louvain-La-Neuve, 1995.
5. The Churchill Lecture, Cambridge, 1996.
6. The Pareto Lecture, Alicante, 1996.
7. The Zeuthen Lecture, Copenhagen, 1996.
8. The Schwartz Lecture, Northwestern University, 1998.  (see the lecture pdf)
9. The Schumpeter Lecturer, EEA. Bolzano, 2000.
10. Katzir Lecture, Tel Aviv University, 2003.
11. Woodward Lecture, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 2003.
12. Presidential Address, The Econometric Society, Providence USA, Melbourne Australia, and Madrid Spain, 2004.
13. The Economic Journal Lecture, Nottingham, 2005.
14. The Nemmers Lecture, Northwestern, 2005.
15. The McKenzie Lecture, Rochester, 2006.
16. The Rosenthal Lecture, Boston University, 2008.
17. The Douglas North Honorary Lecture, Washington University in St. Louis, 2008.
18. The Zvi Griliches Memorial Lectures, New Economic School, Moscow, 2012.
19. Böhm-Bawerk-Lecture, University of Innsbruck, 2016.
20. Hahn Lecture, University of Siena, 2019.
21. Patnikin Lecture, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2019.
22. Catedra Currie Lecture, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2019.
23. George Staller Lecture, Cornell, 2019.

24. Marshall Lectures, Cambridge Univeristy, 2022.

Other Special Lectures:

1. Fifth World Congress of the Econometric Society, MIT, 1985.
2. The XIV Simposio De Analysis Economico, Barcelona, 1989.
3. International Conference in Game Theory, Florence, 1991.
4. Political Economy Lecture Series Harvard University, Harvard, 1991, 2000, 2004.
5. The European Econometric Society, Maastricht, 1994.
6. The 11 th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Cracow, 1999.
7. International Meeting of the Economic Science Association, New York , 2000
8. The Southeast Theory and International Conference, Rice, 2000.
9. Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, Montreal, 2000
10. The Italian-Spanish Meeting of Game Theory and Applications (SING 1), Ischia, 2001.
11. The XVIII Latin American Meetings of the Econometric Society, Buenos Aires, 2001.
12. Association for Computational Linguistics, ACL, Sapporo, Japan, 2003.
13. Moscow High School of Economics 10-Year Anniversary Celebration, Moscow, 2007.
14. Spring Meeting of Young Economists, Hamburg, 2007.
15. Inauguration ceremony of the Bonn Graduate School of Economics, Bonn, 2007.
16. International Society for New Institutional Economics, 11th Annual Conference, Reykjavik, 2007.
17. Communication in Games and Experiments, Lund, 2007.
18. Neuroeconomics: Hype or Hope?, Rotterdam, 2008.
19. Colloquium “Collective choice and economic design” in honor of Frans Spinnewyn, Leuven, 2009.
20. Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society (Plenary Lecture), Seoul, Korea, 2011.
21. Golden Jubilee Conference of the Indian Econometric Society (TIES) & Valedictory Celebrations of IGIDR Silver Jubilee Year, (Inaugural Address), Mumbai, 2013.
22. SING 10 (Invited Speaker), Krakow, 2014.
23. 44th Australian Conference of Economists (ACE2015), (Keynote speaker), Brisbane, Australia, 2015.
24. Conference Honoring Hugo Sonnenschein, (Panel on the Role of Economic Theory) University of Chicago, Chicago, 2015. )
25. 11th Annual Conference on Economic Growth and Development, (Keynote speaker) , New Delhi, 2015. ()
26. The 2016 Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society (AMES2016), (Keynote speaker), Kyoto, 2016.
27. The "Young" Workshop on Economics and Computation (YoungEC17), (Keynote speaker), Tel Aviv, 2016. ()
28. 16e Journées Louis-André Gérard-Varet (Keynote speaker), Aix-en-Provence, 2017.
29. Memorial conference for Reinhard Selten, Bonn, 2017.
30. Chine Game Theory and Mechanism Design , Hangzhou, School of Economics Zhejiang University, Center for Research of Private Economy, Hangzhou, 2017.
31. Tsinghua Conference on Behavioral, Experimental and Theoretical Economics, Beijing, 2017.
32. Foundations of Utility and Risk 2018 - FUR Conference , York, 2018.
33. Warsaw International Economic Meeting (WIEM 2018), Warsaw, 2018.
34. EMS Distinguished Lecture, Dublin, 2022.
35. Tallinn: Evolving Challanges in European Economics: (Keynote Lecture), Talinn, 2022.
36. 16th CSEF-IGIER Symposium on Economics and Institutions (Keynote Lecture), Capri, 2022.
37. 4th Annual Economics Conference, Ahmedabad Univeristy (Plenary lecture), Ahhmedabad, 2023.
38. The 2023 Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society (AMES 2023), (Plenary lecture), Mumbai, 2023.
38. Eminent Speakers Lecture, Asoka University, 2024.

Visiting Positions

Nuffield College (Research Fellow), Oxford, 1979/80.
Bell Laboratorie - Murray Hill (visitor), 1980/1.
Math. Sciences Research Ins. Berkeley, (member) , Fall 1985.
London School of Economics, 1986-9.
Princeton University (visiting professor), Fall 1987.
University of Chicago (visiting professor), Fall 1988.
University of Pennsylvania (visiting professor), Fall 1989.
Columbia University (Olin Fellow), Fall 1990.
New York University, Spring 1996.
Russell-Sage Foundation (Fellow), 1996/7.
New York University, Fall 2003.

Short Visits:

1980 IMSSS, Stanford University
1982 C.V.Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
1983 Institute for International Economic Studies, University of Stockholm
1983 Department of Economics, New York University
1984 Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
1984 Ecole Des Hautes en Sciences Socials, Paris
1985 Department of Economics, The University of Western Ontario
1985 IMSSS, Stanford University
1986 IMSSS, Stanford University
1987 Institute for International Economic Studies, University of Stockholm
1988 G.R.E.Q.E., Aix-Marseille
1988 Department of Economics, The University of Western Ontario
1989 European University, Florence
1989 Bank of Spain, Madrid
1990 Department of Economics, Northwestern University
1992 Department of Economics, McMaster University
1994 Department of Economics, University of Oslo
1995 Department of Economics, Paris X
1996 C.O.R.E., Louvain-La-Neuve.
1996 Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen
1997 Netherlands Network of Economics
1998 Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm
1999 Department of Economics, New York University
2000 Department of Economics, Toronto University
2013,4,5,6,7,8 Summer School of Econometric Society in Seoul, Seoul, Tokyo, Kyoto, Seoul, Singapore
2013,4 Department of Economics, Warwick University



Political Activities:

1969- 1971:    Israeli Defense Forces  (3 years of compulsory service)    
1977- 1978:    The Movement for Different Zionism (founding document 1, 2)
March 1978:   The "Officers Letter" and Peace Now
1981-1982:     Peace Now

List of Publications:


  1. Bargaining and Markets, with Martin Osborne, Academic Press, 1990.  
  2. A Course in Game Theory, with Martin Osborne, MIT Press, 1994.
    • The book page (containing: table of contents, corrections and updates,
    • Chinese translation, China Social Sciences Publishing House, 2000.

  3. Modeling Bounded Rationality, MIT Press, 1998.
    • Chinese translation, China Renmin University, 2004.
    • Japanese translation, Kyoritsu Shuppan, 2008.

  4. Economics and Language, Cambridge University Press, 2000.  
    • The book page
    • CUP book page
    • Chapter 5 was translated to French and published in Critique Economique N°10.Printemps été, 2003. pdf
    • Chinese translation, Shanghai University of Finance & Economics Press, 2004.

  5. Lecture Notes in Microeconomics (modeling the economic agent), Princeton University Press, 2005. (2nd edition, 2012)
    • Chinese translation, Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2007.


  6. Agadot Hakalkala (Heb.), Kineret, Zemorah-Bitan, 2009.
    • Economic Fables (Eng.), Open Book Publishers, 2012.
    • Economic Fables (Jap.), Toyo Keisai Inc., 2016.
    • Economic Fables (Chinese.), Guangxi Normal University Press, 2019.

  7. Models of Microeconomic Theory, with Martin Osborne, Open Book Publishers, 2020. . (2nd edition, 2023)

  8. No Prices No Games ! (four economic models), with Michael Richter, Open Book Publishers, 2024. .

Edited Books
  1. Game Theory in Economics (editor), Edward Elgar 1990. My sincere opinion about buying this book
  2. Models of Bounded Rationality and Mechanism Design, with Jacob Glazer, 2016. World Scientific Series in Economic Theory: Volume 7.




  1. A note About the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule. Econometrica 47 (1979), 511-514. pdf

  2. False Probabilistic Arguments vs. Faulty Intuition. Israel Law Review 14 (1979), 247-254. pdf 

  3. Equilibrium in Supergames with the Overtaking Criterion. Journal of Economic Theory 21 (1979), 1-9. pdf

  4. An Optimal Policy for Offenses that May Have Been Committed By Accident in Applied Game Theory, ed. by S Brams, A Schotter and G Schwodiauer, Wurzberg: Physica-Verlag (1979), 406-413. pdf

  5. A Note on the Duty of Disclosure. Economics Letters 4 (1979), 7-11. pdf  

  6. Ranking the Participants in a Tournament. SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics.38 (1980), 108-111. pdf 

  7. Strong Perfect Equilibrium in Supergames. International Journal of Game Theory 9 (1980), 1-12. pdf

  8. Stability of Decision Under Majority Rule. Journal of Economic Theory 23 (1980), 150-159. pdf

  9. On An Anomaly of the Deterrent Effect of Punishment. Economics Letters 6 (1980), 89-94. pdf

  10. A Further Characterization of the Scores Method for Multi-Round Tournaments and Social Theory, with Shmuel Nitzan. Public Choice 36 (1981), 153-158. pdf

  11. Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. Econometrica 50 (1982), 97-110. pdf 

  12. Time Preference, with Peter Fishburn. International Economic Review 23 (1982), 677-694. pdf

  13. Repeated Insurance Contracts and Moral Hazard, with Menahem Yaari. Journal of Economic Theory 30 (1983), 74-97.pdf

  14. The Reasonable Man - A Social Choice Approach. Theory and Decision 15 (1983), 151-159. pdf

  15. Repeated Two Players Game with Ruin, with Robert Rosenthal. International Journal of Game Theory 14 (1984), 155-177. pdf

  16. The Single Profile Analogies to Multi Profile Theorems: Mathematical Logic's Approach. International Economic Review 25 (1984), 719-730. pdf

  17. Choice of Conjectures in a Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information, in Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining ed by A.Roth, Cambridge University Press (1985), 99-114. pdf

  18. A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information about Time Preferences. Econometrica 53 (1985), 1151-1172. pdf 

  19. Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining, with Asher Wolinsky. Econometrica 53 (1985), 1133-1150. pdf  (see Rubinstein and Wolinsky (2004))

  20. Algebraic Aggregation Theory, with Peter Fishburn. Journal of Economic Theory 38 (1986), 63-77. pdf

  21. Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory 39 (1986), 83-96. pdf

  22. A Sequential Concession Game with Asymmetric Information, with Janusz Ordover, Quarterly Journal of Economics 101 (1986), 879-888. pdf

  23. Aggregation of Equivalence Relations, with P.C.Fishburn, Journal of Classification 3 (1986), 61-65. pdf

  24. The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling, with Ken Binmore and Asher Wolinsky, The Rand Journal of Economics 17 (1986), 176-188. pdf

  25. A Sequential Strategic Theory of Bargaining, in Advances in Economic Theory, ed. by T Bewley, Cambridge Press (1987), 197-224. pdf

  26. Middlemen, with Asher Wolinsky, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102 (1987), 581-594. pdf

  27. The Complexity of Strategies and the Resolution of Conflict: An Introduction, in Global Macroeconomics: Policy Conflict and Cooperation, Bryant and Portes (editors), MacMillan Press (1987), 17-32. pdf

  28. Similarity and Decision-Making Under Risk, Journal of Economic Theory, 46 (1988), 145-153.pdf

  29. The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata, with Dilip Abreu, Econometrica 56 (1988), 1259-1282. pdf (see also Abreu-Rubinstein (1993), Abreu-Rubinstein (2014))

  30. Competitive Equilibrium in a Market with Decentralized Trade and Strategic Behavior: An Introduction, in The Economics of Imperfect Competition and Employment: Joan Robinson and Beyond, G Feiwel (editor), (1989) 243-259. pdf

  31. Reputation and Patience in the War of Attrition, with Lewis Kornhauser and Charles Wilson, Economica 56 (1989), 15-24. pdf see the acknowledgement in Discussion Paper

  32. The Electronic Mail Game: A Game with Almost Common Knowledge, American Economic Review 79 (1989), 385-391. pdf 

  33. Optimal Flexibility of Rules: The Tale of the Wise Principal and the Naive Agent, European Journal of Political Economics 5 (1989) 219-227. pdf

  34. Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behavior and the Walrasian Outcome, with Asher Wolinsky, Review of Economic Studies 57 (1990), 63-78. pdf

  35. On the Logic of “Agreeing to Disagree” Type Results, with Asher Wolinsky, Journal of Economic Theory 51 (1990), 184-193. pdf

  36. New Directions in Economic Theory - Bounded Rationality Revista Espanola De Economie 7 (1990), 3-15. pdf

  37. Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory, Econometrica 59 (1991), 909-924. pdf

  38. Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences, with Asher Wolinsky, American Economic Review, 82 (1992), 600-614. pdf

  39. On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution, with Zvi Safra and William Thomson, Econometrica, 60 (1992), 1171-1186. pdf

  40. Noncooperative Bargaining Models, with Ken Binmore and Martin Osborne, Handbook of Game Theory, (Aumann and Hart editors), (1992), 179-225. pdf

  41. On Price Recognition and Computational Complexity in a Monopolistic Model, Journal of Political Economy, 101 (1993), 473-484. pdf 

  42. A Subjective Perspective of the Interpretation of Economic Theory, in Making Modern Economics, The Makers of Modern Economics, vol I, A.Heertje. (Ed.) (1993), 67-83. pdf

  43. Finite Automata Play a Repeated Extensive Game, with M.Piccione, Journal of Economic Theory, 61 (1993), 160-168. pdf

  44. Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability, with Asher Wolinsky, Games and Economic Behavior, 6 (1994), 299-311. pdf

  45. Equilibrium in Supergames in Essay in Game theory in honor of Michael Maschler, N.Meggiddo (ed.) Springer-Verlag, 1994, 17-28. pdf original discussion paper(1977)

  46. Remarks on Repeated Extensive Games, with Asher Wolinsky, Games and Economic Behavior, 9(1995), 110-115. pdf 

  47. John Nash: The Master of Economic Modeling, The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 97(1995), 9-13. pdf

  48. On the Interpretation of Two Game Theoretical Models of Bargaining, in Arrow,K., Mnookin,R., Ross,L. Tversky,A. and R.Wilson (eds.) Barriers to Conflict Resolution, Norton, 1995, 120-130. pdf 
    [French: À propos de la lecture de deux modèles théoriques de négociation », Négociations, 2012/1 n° 17, p. 23-33.]

  49. Why are certain Properties of Binary relations Relatively More Common in Natural Language?, Econometrica, 64 (1996), 343-356. pdf 

  50. An Extensive Game as a Guide for Solving a Normal Game, with Jacob Glazer, Journal of Economic Theory, 70 (1996), 32-42. pdf 

  51. Naive Strategies in Competitive Games, with Amos Tversky and Dana Heller, in Understanding Strategic Interaction - Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten, W.Guth et al. (editors), Springer-Verlag, 1996, 394-402.pdf
    (see episode in NUMB3RS season 2 episode 5)

  52. A Simple Model of Equilibrium in Search Procedures, with Chaim Fershtman, Journal of Economic Theory, 72 (1997), 432-441. pdf (see also Fershtman-Rubinstein (2019) photo: Uzi Segal)

  53. On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall, with Michele Piccione, Games and Economic Behavior 20 (1997), 3-24. pdf

  54. The Absent Minded Driver's Paradox: Synthesis and Responses, with Michele Piccione, Games and Economic Behavior 20 (1997), 121-130.pdf

  55. On the Question "Who is a J?": A Social Choice Approach, with Asa Kasher, Logique et Analyse 160 (1997), 385-395. pdf

  56. Games with Procedurally Rational Players, with Martin Osborne, American Economic Review 88 (1998), 834-847. pdf 

  57. Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions, with Jacob Glazer, Journal of Economic Theory, 79 (1998), 157-173. pdf

  58. Definable Preferences: An Example, European Economic Review, 42 (1998), 553-560. pdf

  59. Choice Problems with a "Reference" Point, with Lin Zhou, Mathematics of Social Sciences, 37 (1999), 205-210. pdf

  60. Experience from a Course in Game Theory: Pre and Post-class Problem Sets as a Didactic Device, Games and Economic Behavior 28 (1999), 155-170.pdf  ( Better see an extended "Second Edition" )

  61. A Theorist's View of Experiments. European Economic Review, 45 (2001), 615-628. pdf

  62. Debates and Decisions, On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules, with Jacob Glazer. Games and Economic Behavior, 36 (2001), 158-173. pdf

  63. Irrational Diversification in Multiple Decision Problems. European Economic Review, 46 (2002), 1369-1378. pdf 

  64. Rationalizing Choice Functions by Mutltiple Rationales, with Gil Kalai and Rani Spiegler. Econometrica, 70(2002), 2481-2488. pdf

  65. Definable Preferences: Another Example (Searching for a Boyfriend in a Foreign Town) |in "The Scope of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science", Proceedings of the 11th International Congress of Logic, Ed. by Peter Gardenfors, et al. Kluwer, 2002, vol I, 235-243. pdf
    [See Center of Research in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory, Research Memorandum No. 31, January 1978.]

  66. Modeling the Economic Interaction of Agents with Diverse Abilities to Recognize Equilibrium Patterns, with Michele Piccione. Journal of European Economic Association , 1 (2003), 212-223. pdf

  67. "Economics and Psychology"? The Case of Hyperbolic Discounting. International Economic Review 44 (2003), 1207-1216. pdf
    Reviewed in NAJ Economics 1:1 Rejected from QJE(see rejection letter)

  68. Sampling Equilibrium with an Application to Strategic Voting, with Martin Osborne. Games and Economic Behavior, 45 (2003), 434-441. pdf

  69. The Curse of Wealth and Power, with Michele Piccione. Journal of Economic Theory ,117 (2004), 119-123. pdf

  70. On Optimal Rules of Persuasion, with Jacob Glazer. Econometrica, 72 (2004), 1715-1736. pdf

  71. A Game Theoretic Approach to the Pragmatics of Debates: An Expository Note, with Jacob Glazer, in Game Theory and Pragmatics, Ed. By Anton Benz, Gerhard Jaeger, and Robert van Rooij. 2005, 251-265. Palgrave MacMillan. pdf

  72. A Model of Choice from Lists, with Yuval Salant. Theoretical Economics, 1 (2006), 3-17. pdf (see 2Xyuval)

  73. A Sceptic's Comment on the Study of Economics. Economic Journal, 116 (2006), C1-C9. pdf

  74. Dilemmas of An Economic Theorist. Econometrica, 74 (2006), 865-883. pdf.
    (A Spanish translation: Revista De Economia Institucional, 8 (2006), 191-213)

  75. A Study in the Pragmatics of Persuasion: A Game Theoretical Approach, with Jacob Glazer. Theoretical Economics, 1 (2006), 395-410. pdf
    (Reprinted in New Perspectives on Games and Interaction, K.Eapt and R.van Rooij (eds.) Amsterdam University Press, 2008).

  76. Comments on Behavioral Economics, in Advances in Economic Theory (2005 World Congress of the Econometric Society), Edited by R. Blundell, W.K. Newey and T. Persson, Cambridge University Press, 2006, vol II, 246-254. pdf or pdf

  77. Equilibrium in the Jungle, with Michele Piccione. Economic Journal, 117 (2007), 883-896. pdf (the paper won the 2007 RES prize)

  78. Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: A Study of Response Times. Economic Journal, 117 (2007), 1243-1259. pdf

  79. Luxury Prices: An Expository Note, with Michele Piccione. Japanese Economic Review, 59 (2008), 127-132. pdf

  80. Money Pumps in the Market, with Rani Spiegler. Journal of European Economics Review, 6 (2008), 237–253. pdf

  81. Some Thoughts on the Principle of Revealed Preference, with Yuval Salant. in The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics: A Handbook, Eds. A.Caplin and A.Schotter, 2008, 115-124, New York: Oxford University Press. pdf

  82. (A,f), Choice with Frames, with Yuval Salant. Review of Economic Studies, 75 (2008), 1287-1296. pdf

  83. Comments on NeuroEconomics. Economics and Philosophy, 24 (2008), 485-494. pdf
    French: review francaise d'economie, 23 (2009), 159-174.

  84. Edgar Allan Poe's Riddle: Do Guessers Outperform Misleaders in a Repeated Matching Pennies Game? , with Kfir Eliaz. Games and Economic Behavior, 71 (2011), 88-99. pdf

  85. Choosing the Two Finalists, with Kfir Eliaz and Michael Richter. Economic Theory, 46 (2011), 211-219. pdf

  86. Tracking decision makers under uncertainty, with Amos Arieli and Yaniv Ben-Ami. American Economic Journal - Microeconomics, 3 (2011), 68-76. pdf

  87. Eliciting Welfare Preferences from Behavioral Datasets, with Yuval Salant. Review of Economic Studies, 79 (2012), 375-387. pdf

  88. The 11-20 Money Request Game: A Level-k Reasoning Study, with Ayala Arad. American Economic Review, 102 (2012), 3561-3573. pdf

  89. On the Likelihood of Cyclic Comparisons, with Uzi Segal. Journal of Economic Theory, 147 (2012), 2483-2491. pdf

  90. Multi-Dimensional Iterative Reasoning in Action: The Case of the Colonel Blotto Game, with Ayala Arad. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 84 (2012), 571-585. pdf

  91. A Model of Persuasion with a Boundedly Rational Agent, with Jacob Glazer. Journal of Political Economy, 120 (2012), 1057-1082. pdf

  92. Strategic Tournaments, with Ayala Arad.  American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5 (2013), 31-54. pdf

  93. Response Time and Decision Making: A "Free" Experimental Study. Judgment and Decision Making, 8 (2013), 540-551. pdf  (full version: pdf)

  94. On Fairness of Random Procedures, with Kfir Eliaz. Economics Letters, 123 (2014), 168–170. pdf

  95. Complex Questionnaires, with Jacob Glazer. Econometrica, 82 (2014), 1529-1541. pdf

  96. A Model of Boundedly Rational "Neuro" Agents, with Kfir Eliaz. Economic Theory, 57 (2014), 515-528 . pdf

  97. Back to Fundamentals: Equilibrium in Abstract Economies, with Michael Richter. American Economic Review, 105 (2015), 2570-2594. pdf

  98. Isn't everyone like me?": On the presence of self-similarity in strategic interactions, with Yuval Salant. Judgment and Decision Making, 11 (2016), 168-173. pdf

  99. A Typology of Players: between Instinctive and Contemplative, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131 (2016), 859-890. pdf

  100. Comments on Economic Models, Economics and Economists: Remarks on Economics Rules by Dani Rodrik. Journal of Economic Literature, 55 (2017), 162-172. pdf

  101. The People's Perspective on Libertarian-Paternalistic Policies, with Ayala Arad. Journal of Law and Economics, 61 (2018), 311-333. pdf

  102. Coordinating with a "Problem Solver", with Jacob Glazer. Management Science, 65 (2019), 2813-2819. pdf (see GR2019)

  103. Multi-dimensional Reasoning in Games: Framework, Equilibrium and Applications, with Ayala Arad, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 11 (2019), 285-318. pdf

  104. "Convex Preferences": a new definition, with Michael Richter. Theoretical Economics, 14 (2019), 1169-1183. pdf

  105. The permissible and the forbidden, with Michael Richter. Journal of Economic Theory, 188 (2020), article 105042. pdf

  106. Holding a group together: non-game-theory vs. game-theory, with Michael Richter. Economic Journal, 131 (2021), 2629–2641. pdf

  107. Modeling Bounded Rationality in Economic Theory: Four Examples. in Routledge Handbook of Bounded Rationality, edited by Riccardo Viale, Routledge, (2021), 423-435. pdf

  108. Story Builders, with Jacob Glazer. Journal of Economic Theory, 193 (2021), article 105211. pdf

  109. The Biased Preferences Equilibrium, with Asher Wolinsky, Economics and Philosophy, 38 (2022), 24-33. pdf

  110. Equilibrium in a Civilized Jungle, with Kemal Yildiz. Theoretical Economics, 17 (2022), 943-953. pdf

  111. An étude in modeling the definability of equilibrium, with Kemal Yildiz. Review of Economic Design, 26 (2022), 543-552. pdf

  112. Unilateral Stability in Matching Problems, with Michael Richter. Journal of Economic Theory, 216 (2024), 105780. pdf, on line

  113. People Making Predictions Based on Data: Holistic and Atomistic Procedures, with Jacob Glazer. Journal of Economic Theory, 216 (2024), 105791. pdf, on line


In Process:

Failing to correctly aggregate signals, with Michele Piccione. pdf


1. "Afterword", in the 60th anniversary edition of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by Oskar Morgenstern and John Von Neumann, Princeton University Press, 2004. pdf.
2. Freak-Freakonomics, The Economists' Voice : Vol. 3 (2007): Iss. 9, Article 7. pdf.    Published in Hebrew in Haaretz, July 2006.
3. Interview in Game Theory: 5 Questions, edited by V.F.Hendricks and P. Gukdborg Hansen, Automatic Press / VIP, 2007. pdf.

4. 10 Q&A: Experienced advice for “lost” graduate students in Economics. Journal of Economic Education, 44 (2013), 193-196. pdf
(translation to Turkish in Iktisat ve Toplum)
5. Government Interventions that Use Psychological Insights - Why Does it Bother Us? (with Ayala Arad) (2019)
Innovations in Management, 3, 1-9. (Hebrew version)  
6. The Competitive Stock Market as Cartel Maker: Some Examples. (with Menahem Yaari), STICERD Paper No' TE/1983/84 (1983).



Book Reviews:

  1. Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics and Psychology, (Edited by R.M.Hograth and M.W.Reder) Economica, 56 (1989), 406-7. jstor

  2. Theory of Industrial Organization by J. Tirole: Economica, 56 (1989), 401-402. jstor

  3. Game Theory by Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole: Economica, 60 (1993), 245-6. jstor

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