(vitae: updated  1 Jan 2012)

Ariel Rubinstein
Main Affiliation School of Economics , Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel 69978
Secondary Affiliation Department of Economics, New York University, New York, NY, 10003, USA
Telephone

+972-3-642-1111 (Home) +972-3-640-9601 (Office, TA)  

+1-212-992-9772 (Office, NYU) +1-917-412-5844 (Cell, USA)
e-contact e-mail:  rariel@post.tau.ac.il   skype:  arielrubinstein
Homepage http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/
Birth Jerusalem  13/4/1951
Children Michal and Yuval.
Citizenship Israel

Education::
The Hebrew University, 1972-1979:
1974: B.Sc. Mathematics, Economics and Statistics
1975: M.A. Economics (supervisor: Menahem Yaari)
1976: M.Sc Mathematics (supervisor: Bezalel Peleg)
1979: Ph.D. Economics (supervisor: Menahem Yaari)

Permanent Employment:

The Hebrew University (Department of Economics):
Senior Lecturer, October 1981
Associate Professor, October 1984
Professor, October 1986-March 1990.
 
 
 
Tel Aviv University (Department of Economics):
Professor, April 1990-
Salzberg Chair, May 1990-
Chairperson, July 1991-May 1993.
 
 
 
Princeton University (Department of Economics):
Lecturer in Rank of Professor, 1991-2004
 
New York University (Department of Economics)
Professor, September 2004-


Honors:

Fellow of The Econometric Society: 1985 (executive committee 1994-7)
Foreign honorary member of The American Academy of Arts and Sciences: 1994
Foreign honorary member of The American Economic Association: 1995
Fellow of The Israeli Academy of Sciences: 1995
The Michael Bruno memorial award: 2000
Pras Israel: 2002
Doctor Honorees Causa of Tilburg University: 2002
Honorary Fellow, Nuffield College, Oxford: 2002 
President of The Econometric Society: 2004  (presidential report)
Member, European Academy of Sciences and Arts: 2004
Nemmers Prize, Northwestern University: 2004
Fellow, European Economic Association: 2004
The EMET Prize: 2006
Elected Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy: 2007
Rothschild Prize: 2010
Economic Theory Fellow: 2011
 

 

Editorships:

Econometrica: Associate Editor, 1984-1992.
Journal of Economic Theory: Associate Editor, 1986-1994.
Review of Economic Studies: Member of editorial board, 1987-1988; Foreign Editor, 1988-1992
Games and Economic Behavior: Associate Editor, 1988-2002 (A letter of resignation from the GT Society)
Review of Economic Design: Member of editorial board, 1993-2007
Mathematics of Social Sciences: Associate editor, 1993-2001
Economics and Philosophy: Member of editorial board, 1994-
International Journal of Game Theory: Member of editorial board, 1995-2000
NAJ Economics: Member of editorial board, 2001-2007
Journal of European Economic Association: Advisory Committe, 2003-
Theoretical Economics, Executive Board, 2005- 2009
AEJ Micro: Board of Editors, 2010-

Named Lectures:

The Pazner Lecture, Tel-Aviv, 1982.
The Walras-Bowley Lecture, The Econometric Society Meeting, Minnesota, 1988.
Hooker Lectures, McMaster University, Canada, 1992.
The CORE Lectures, Louvain-La-Neuve, 1995.
The Churchill Lecture, Cambridge, 1996.
The Pareto Lecture, Alicante, 1996.
The Zeuthen Lecture, Copenhagen, 1996.
The Schwartz Lecture, Northwestern University, 1998.  (see the lecture pdf)
The Schumpeter Lecturer, EEA, Bolzano, 2000.
Katzir Lecture, Tel Aviv Univerity, 2003.
Woodward Lecture, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 2003.
Presidential Address, The Econometric Society, Providence USA, Melbourne Australia, and Madrid Spain, 2004.
The Economic Journal Lecture, Nottingham, 2005.
The Nemmers Lecture, Northwestern, 2005.
The McKenzie Lecture, Rochster, 2006.
The Rosenthal Lecture, Boston Univeristy, 2008.
The Douglas North Honorary Lecture, Washington Univeristy in St. Louis, 2008.
 



Other Special Lectures:

Fifth World Congress of the Econometric Society, MIT, 1985.
The XIV Simposio De Analysis Economico, Barcelona, 1989.
International Conference in Game Theory, Florence, 1991.
Political Economy Lecture Series Harvard University, Harvard, 1991, 2000, 2004.
The European Econometric Society, Masstricht, 1994.
The 11 th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Cracow, 1999.
International Meeting of the Economic Science Association, New York , 2000
The Southeast Theory and International Conference, Rice, 2000.
Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, Montreal, 2000
The Italian Meeting of Game Theory and Applications, Ischia, 2001.
The XVIII Latin American Meetings of the Econometric Society, Buenos Aires, 2001.
Association for Computational Linguistics, ACL, Sapporo, Japan, 2003.
ICEF 10-Year Anniversary Celebration, Moscow, 2007.
Spring Meeting of Young Economists, Hamburg, 2007.
Inauguration ceremony of the Bonn Graduate School of E
conomics, Bonn, 2007.
International Society for New Institutional Economics, 11th Annual Conference, Reykjavik, 2007.
Communication in Games and Experiments, Lund, 2007.
Neuroeconomics: Hype or Hope?, Roterdam, 2008
Colloquium “Collective choice and economic design” in honour of Frans Spinnewyn, Leuven, 2009
Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society (Plenary Lecture), Seoul, Korea, 2011



Visiting Positions

Nuffield College, Oxford, (Research Fellow) 1979/80.
Bell Laboratories, Murray Hill (visitor) 1980/1.
Math. Sciences Research Ins., Berkeley (member) Fall 1985.
London School of Economics, London 1986-9.
Princeton University (visiting professor) Fall 1987.
University of Chicago (visiting professor) Fall 1988.
University of Pennsylvania (visiting professor) Fall 1989.
Columbia University (Olin Fellow) Fall 1990.
New York University Spring 1996.
Russell-Sage Foundation (Fellow) 96/7.
New York University Fall 2003.

Short Visits:

1980 IMSSS, Stanford University
1982 C.V.Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
1983 Institute for International Economic Studies, University of Stockholm
1983 Department of Economics, New York University
1984 Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
1984 Ecole Des Hautes en Sciences Socials, Paris
1985 Department of Economics, The University of Western Ontario
1985 IMSSS, Stanford University
1986 IMSSS, Stanford University
1987 Institute for International Economic Studies, University of Stockholm
1988 G.R.E.Q.E., Aix-Marseille
1988 Department of Economics, The University of Western Ontario
1989 European University, Florence
1989 Bank of Spain, Madrid
1990 Department of Economics, Northwestern University
1992 Department of Economics, McMaster University
1994 Department of Economics, University of Oslo
1995 Department of Economics, Paris X
1996 C.O.R.E., Louvain-La-Neuve.
1996 Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen
1997 Netherlands Network of Economics
1998 Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm
1999 Department of Economics, New York University
2000 Department of Economics, Toronto University
 

Political Activities
1969- 1971:    Israeli Defince forces  (3 years of compulsory service)    
1977- 1978:    The Movmenet for Different Zionism
March 1978:   The "Officers Letter" and Peace Now
1981-1982:     Peace Now





List of Publications:

 Books

  1. Bargaining and Markets, with M.Osborne, Academic Press 1990  
  2. A Course in Game Theory, with M.Osborne, MIT Press, 1994.
    • The book page (containing: table of contents, corrections and updates,
    • Chinese translation, China Social Sciences Publishing House, 2000.
  3. Modeling Bounded Rationality, MIT Press, 1998.
  4. Economics and Language, Cambridge University Press, 2000.  
    • The book page
    • CUP book page
    • Chapter 5 was translated to French and published in Critique Economique N°10.Printemps été, 2003 pdf
    • Chinese translation, Shanghai University of Finance & Economics Press, 2004.

  5. Lecture Notes in Microeconomics (modeling the economic agent), Princeton Univeristy Press, 2005.
    • Chinese translation, Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2007.

 

A Semi Academic Book

Agadot Hakalkala (Heb.), Kineret, Zemorah-Bitan, 2009.
 
 
An Edited Book

Game Theory in Economics (editor), Edward Elgar 1990. My sincere opinion about buying this book

Articles

  1. A note About the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule, Econometrica 47 (1979), 511-514. pdf jstor
  2. False Probabilistic Arguments vs. Faulty Intuition, Israel Law Review 14 (1979), 247-254. pdf   html
  3. Equilibrium in Supergames with the Overtaking Criterion Journal of Economic Theory 21 (1979), 1-9. pdf
  4. An Optimal Policy for Offenses that May Have Been Committed By Accident in Applied Game Theory, ed. by S Brams, A Schotter and G Schwodiauer, Wurzberg: Physica-Verlag (1979), 406-413. pdf
  5. A Note on the Duty of Disclosure, Economic Letters 4 (1979), 7-11. pdf  science direct
  6. Ranking the Participants in a Tournament, Journal of the Society of Industrial and Applied Mathematics 38 (1980), 108-111. pdf  jstor
  7. Strong Perfect Equilibrium in Supergames, International Journal of Game Theory 9 (1980), 1-12. pdf
  8. Stability of Decision Under Majority Rule, Journal of Economic Theory 23 (1980), 150-159. pdf
  9. On An Anomaly of the Deterrent Effect of Punishment, Economic Letters 6 (1980), 89-94. pdf science direct
  10. A Further Characterization of the Scores Method for Multi-Round Tournaments and Social Theory, with S.Nitzan, Public Choice 36 (1981), 153-158. pdf
  11. Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, Econometrica 50 (1982), 97-110. pdf jstor
  12. Time Preference, with P.Fishburn, International Economic Review 23 (1982), 677-694. pdf jstor
  13. Repeated Insurance Contracts and Moral Hazard, with M.E.Yaari, Journal of Economic Theory 30 (1983), 74-97.pdf
  14. The Reasonable Man - A Social Choice Approach, Theory and Decision 15 (1983), 151-159. pdf
  15. Repeated Two Players Game with Ruin, with R.Rosenthal, International Journal of Game Theory 14 (1984), 155-177. pdf
  16. The Single Profile Analogies to Multi Profile Theorems: Mathematical Logic's Approach, International Economic Review 25 (1984), 719-730. pdf jstor
  17. Choice of Conjectures in a Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information, in Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining ed by A.Roth, Cambridge University Press (1985), 99-114. pdf
  18. A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information about Time Preferences, Econometrica 53 (1985), 1151-1172. pdf  jstor
  19. Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining, with A.Wolinsky, Econometrica 53 (1985), 1133-1150. pdf  jstor (see Rubinstein and Wolinsky (2004))
  20. Algebraic Aggregation Theory, with P.C.Fishburn, Journal of Economic Theory 38 (1986), 63-77. pdf
  21. Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, Journal of Economic Theory 39 (1986), 83-96. pdf
  22. A Sequential Concession Game with Asymmetric Information, with J.Ordover, Quarterly Journal of Economics 101 (1986), 879-888. pdf jstor
  23. Aggregation of Equivalence Relations, with P.C.Fishburn, Journal of Classification 3 (1986), 61-65. pdf
  24. The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling, with K.Binmore and A.Wolinsky, The Rand Journal of Economics 17 (1986), 176-188. pdf jstor
  25. A Sequential Strategic Theory of Bargaining, in Advances in Economic Theory, ed. by T Bewley, Cambridge Press (1987), 197-224. pdf
  26. Middlemen, with A.Wolinsky, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102 (1987), 581-594. pdf jstor
  27. The Complexity of Strategies and the Resolution of Conflict: An Introduction, in Global Macroeconomics: Policy Conflict and Cooperation, Bryant and Portes (editors), MacMillan Press (1987), 17-32. pdf
  28. Similarity and Decision-Making Under Risk, Journal of Economic Theory, 46 (1988), 145-153.pdf
  29. The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata, with D.Abreu, Econometrica 56 (1988), 1259-1282. pdf   jstor (see also Abreu-Rubinstein (1993))
  30. Competitive Equilibrium in a Market with Decentralized Trade and Strategic Behavior: An Introduction, in The Economics of Imperfect Competition and Employment: Joan Robinson and Beyond, G Feiwel (editor), (1989) 243-259. pdf
  31. Reputation and Patience in the War of Attrition, with L.Kornhauser and C.Wilson, Economica 56 (1989), 15-24. pdf jstor
  32. The Electronic Mail Game: A Game with Almost Common Knowledge, American Economic Review 79 (1989), 385-391. pdf  jstor
  33. Optimal Flexibility of Rules: The Tale of the Wise Principal and the Naive Agent, European Journal of Political Economics 5 (1989) 219-227. pdf
  34. Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behavior and the Walrasian Outcome, with A.Wolinsky, Review of Economic Studies 57 (1990), 63-78. pdf  jstor
  35. On the Logic of “Agreeing to Disagree” Type Results, with A.Wolinsky, Journal of Economic Theory 51 (1990), 184-193. pdf
  36. New Directions in Economic Theory - Bounded Rationality Revista Espanola De Economie 7 (1990), 3-15. pdf
  37. Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory, Econometrica 59 (1991), 909-924. pdf jstor
  38. Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences, with A.Wolinsky, American Economic Review, 82 (1992), 600-614. pdf  jstor
  39. On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution, with Z.Safra and W.Thomson, Econometrica, 60 (1992), 1171-1186. pdf  jstor
  40. Noncooperative Bargaining Models, with K.Binmore and M.Osborne, Handbook of Game Theory, (Aumann and Hart editors), (1992), 179-225. pdf
  41. On Price Recognition and Computational Complexity in a Monopolistic Model, Journal of Political Economy, 101 (1993), 473-484. pdf  jstor
  42. A Subjective Perspective of the Interpretation of Economic Theory, in Making Modern Economics, The Makers of Modern Economics, vol I, A.Heertje. (ed.) (1993), 67-83. pdf
  43. Finite Automata Play a Repeated Extensive Game, with M.Piccione, Journal of Economic Theory, 61 (1993), 160-168. pdf  science direct
  44. Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability, with A.Wolinsky, Games and Economic Behavior, 6 (1994), 299-311. pdf science direct
  45. Equilibrium in Supergames in Essay in Game theory in honor of Michael Maschler, N.Meggiddo (ed.) Springer-Verlag, 1994, 17-28. pdf original discussion paper(1977)

  46. Remarks on Repeated Extensive Games, with A.Wolinsky, Games and Economic Behavior, 9(1995), 110-115. pdf  science direct
  47. John Nash: The Master of Economic Modeling, The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 97(1995), 9-13. pdf
  48. On the Interpretation of Two Game Theoretical Models of Bargaining, in Arrow,K., Mnookin,R., Ross,L. Tversky,A. and R.Wilson (eds.) Barriers to Conflict Resolution, Norton, 1995, 120-130. pdf
  49. Why are certain Properties of Binary relations Relatively More Common in Natural Language?, Econometrica, 64 (1996), 343-356. pdf  jstor
  50. An Extensive Game as a Guide for Solving a Normal Game, with J.Glazer, Journal of Economic Theory, 70 (1996), 32-42. pdf  science direct
  51. Naive Strategies in Competitive Games, with A.Tversky and D.Heller, in Understanding Strategic Interaction - Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten, W.Guth et al. (editors), Springer-Verlag, 1996, 394-402.pdf (eopisode in NUMB3RS)
  52. A Simple Model of Equilibrium in Search Procedures, with C.Fershtman, Journal of Economic Theory, 72 (1997), 432-441. pdf science direct
  53. On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall, with M.Piccione, Games and Economic Behavior 20 (1997), 3-24. pdf science direct
  54. The Absent Minded Driver's Paradox: Synthesis and Responses, with M.Piccione, Games and Economic Behavior 20 (1997), 121-130.pdf science direct
  55. On the Question "Who is a J?": A Social Choice Approach, with A.Kasher, Logique et Analyse 160 (1997), 385-395. pdf
  56. Games with Procedurally Rational Players, with M.Osborne, American Economic Review 88 (1998), 834-847. pdf  jstor
  57. Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions, with J.Glazer, Journal of Economic Theory, 79 (1998), 157-173. pdf science direct
  58. Definable Preferences: An Example, European Economic Review, 42 (1998), 553-560. pdf science direct
  59. Choice Problems with a "Reference" Point, with L. Zhou, Mathematics of Social Sciences, 37 (1999), 205-210. pdf science direct
  60. Experience from a Course in Game Theory: Pre and Post-class Problem Sets as a Didactic Device, Games and Economic Behavior 28 (1999), 155-170. science direct ( Better see an extended "Second Edition" )
  61. A Theorist's View of Experiments, European Economic Review 45 (2001), 615-628. pdf science direct  
  62. Debates and Decisions, On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules, with J.Glazer Games and Economic Behavior, 36 (2001), 158-173. pdf science direct
  63. Irrational Diversification in Multiple Decision Problems, European Economic Review, 46 (2002), 1369-1378. pdf  science direct

  64. Rationalizing Choice Functions by Mutltiple Rationales, with Gil Kalai and Rani Spiegler, Econometrica, 70(2002), 2481-2488. pdf
  65. Definable Preferences: Another Example (Searching for a Boyfriend in a Foreign Town) |in "The Scope of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science", Proceedings of the 11th International Congress of Logic, Ed. by Peter Gardenfors, et al. Kluwer, 2002, vol I, 235-243. pdf
    [See Center of Research in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory, Research Memorndum No. 31, January 1978.]
  66. Modeling the Economic Interaction of Agents with Diverse Abilities to Recognize Equilibrium Patterns, with Michele Piccione, Journal of European Economic Association , 1 (2003), 212-223. pdf
  67. "Economics and Psychology"? The Case of Hyperbolic Discounting, International Economic Review 44 (2003), 1207-1216. pdf html
    Reviewed in NAJ Economics 1:1 Rejected from QJE(see rejection letter)
  68. Sampling Equilibrium with an Application to Strategic Voting, with Martin Osborne, Games and Economic Behavior, 45 (2003), 434-441. pdf
    science direct

  69. The Curse of Wealth and Power, with Michele Piccione, Journal of Economic Theory ,117 (2004), 119-123. pdf science direct

  70. On Optimal Rules of Persuasion, with Jacob Glazer, Econometrica, 72 (2004), 1715-1736. pdf
  71. A Game Theoretic Approach to the Pragmatics of Debates: An Expository Note, with Jacob Glazer, in Game Theory and Pragmatics, Ed. by Anton Benz, Gerhard Jaeger, and Robert van Rooij. 2005, 251-265. Palgrave MacMillan. pdf

  72. A Model of Choice from Lists, with Yuval Salant, Theoretical Economics, 1 (2006), 3-17. pdf (see 2Xyuval)
  73. A Skeptic Comment on the Studies of Economics, Economic Journal, 116 (2006), C1-C9. pdf   html
  74. Dilemmas of An Economic Theorist, Econometrica, 74 (2006), 865-883. pdf
    (Spanish tarnslation: Revista De Economia Institucional, 8 (2006), 191-213)

  75. A Study in the Pragmatics of Persuasion: A Game Theoretical Approach, with Kobi Glazer, Theoretical Economics, 1 (2006), 395-410. pdf
    (Reprinted in New Perspectives on Games and Interaction, K.EApt and R.van Rooij (eds.) Amsterdam Univeristy Press, 2008).

  76. Comments on Behavioral Economics, in Advances in Economic Theory (2005 World Congress of the Econometric Society), Edited by R. Blundell, W.K. Newey and T. Persson, Cambridge University Press, 2006, vol II, 246-254. pdf or pdf

  77. Equilibrium in the Jungle, with Michele Piccione, Economic Journal, 117 (2007), 883-896. pdf (the paper won the 2007 RES prize)
  78. Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: A Study of Response Times, Economic Journal, 117 (2007), 1243-1259. pdf
  79. Luxury Prices: An Expository Note, with Michele Piccione, Japanese Economic Review, 59 (2008), 127-132. pdf
  80. Money Pumps in the Market, with Rani Spiegler. Journal of European Economics Review, 6 (2008), 237–253. pdf
  81. Some Thoughts on the Principle of Revealed Preference, with Yuval Salant, in The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics: A Handbook, Eds. A.Caplin and A.Schotter, 2008, 115-124, New York: Oxford Univeristy Press. pdf
  82. (A,f), Choice with Frames, with Yuval Salant. Review of Economic Studies, 75 (2008), 1287-1296. pdf

  83. Comments on NeuroEconomics. Economics and Philosophy, 24 (2008), 485-494. pdf
    French: review francaise d'economie, 23 (2009), 159-174.

  84. Edgar Allan Poe's Riddle: Do Guessers Outperform Misleaders in a Repeated Matching Pennies Game? , with Kfir Eliaz. Games and Economic Behavior. 71 (2011), 88-99. pdf

  85. Choosing the Two Finalists, with Kfir Eliaz and Michael Richter. Economic Theory 46 (2011), 211-219. pdf

  86. Tracking decision makers under uncertainty, with Amos Arieli and Yaniv Ben-Ami. American Economic Joutnal - Micro 3(2011), 68-76. pdf
  87. Eliciting Welfare Preferences from Behavioral Datasets, with Yuval Salant. Review of Economic Studies (2012). pdf

  88. The 11-20 Money Request Game: A Level-k Reasoning Study, with Ayala Arad. forthcoming American Economic Review. pdf



Discussion Papers:

  1. Colonel Blotto's Top Secret Files: Multi-Dimensional Iterative Reasoning in Action, with Ayala Arad. pdf
  2. On the Likelihood of Cyclic Comparisons, with Uzi Segal. pdf

  3. A Model of Persuasion with a Boundedly Rational Agent, with Jacob Glazer. pdf

 

Book Reviews:

  1. Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics and Psychology, (Edited by R.M.Hograth and M.W.reder) Economica, 56 (1989), 406-7. jstor
  2. Theory of Industrial Organization by J.Tirole: Economica, 56 (1989), 401-402. jstor
  3. Game Theory by Fudenberg, D. and J.Tirole: Economica, 60 (1993), 245-6. jstor
  4. Fair Division, by Steven Brams and Alan Taylor, Economics and Philosophy, 13 (1997), 113-116. pdf

  5. An Emipirically Based Microeconomics, by Herbert, H. Simon: Journal of Economic Literature, 37 (1999), 1711-2.pdf
  6. The Essential John Nash, by Harold W. Kuhn and Sylvia Nasar (eds.): Times Higher Education Supplement 25 April 2003.html
  7. The Economics of Language, by Donald M. Lamberton (ed.), The Economics Record, 79 (2003), 272-3. pdf
  8. "Afterword", in the 60th anniversary edition of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by Oskar Morgenstern and John Von Neumann, Princeton Univeristy Press, 2004. pdf.

 



Other:

  1. Freak-Freakonomics, The Economists' Voice : Vol. 3 (2007): Iss. 9, Article 7. Available at: http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol3/iss9/art7 and in pdf . Published in Hebrew in Haaretz, July 2006.

  2. Interview in Game Theory: 5 Questions, edited by V.F.Hendricks and P. Gukdborg Hansen, Automatic Press / VIP, 2007 pdf.