Ariel Rubinstein
Sorted List of Publications:
(Full
Vitae)
Books
- Bargaining and Markets, with Martin Osborne, Academic
Press, 1990.
- A Course in Game Theory, with Martin Osborne, MIT
Press, 1994.
- Modeling Bounded Rationality, MIT Press, 1998.
- Economics and Language, Cambridge University Press,
2000.
- Lecture Notes in Microeconomics (modeling the economic
agent), Princeton University Press, 2005.
- Economic Fables
(Eng.), Open Book Publishers, 2012.
- Models of Microeconomic Theory, with Martin Osborne Open Book Publishers,
2020.
Game Theory
- G1. Repeated Games
1. Equilibrium in Supergames with the Overtaking Criterion
Journal of Economic Theory 21 (1979), 1-9. pdf
2. An Optimal Policy for Offenses that May Have Been
Committed By Accident in Applied Game Theory, ed. by S Brams, A Schotter
and G Schwodiauer, Wurzberg: Physica-Verlag (1979), 406-413. pdf
3. Strong Perfect Equilibrium in Supergames, International Journal of Game
Theory 9 (1980), 1-12. pdf
4. Repeated Insurance Contracts and Moral Hazard, with M.E.Yaari,
Journal of Economic Theory 30 (1983), 74-97.pdf
5. Repeated Two Players Game with Ruin, with R.Rosenthal, International
Journal of Game Theory 14 (1984), 155-177. pdf
6. Equilibrium
in Supergames in Essay in Game theory in honor of Michael Maschler, N.Meggiddo
(ed.) Springer-Verlag, 1994, 17-28. pdf original
discussion paper(1977)
7. Remarks on Repeated Extensive Games, with A.Wolinsky, Games
and Economic Behavior, 9(1995), 110-115. pdf
G2. Bargaining
1. Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, Econometrica
50 (1982), 97-110. pdf
2. A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information about Time
Preferences, Econometrica 53 (1985), 1151-1172. pdf
3. Choice of Conjectures in a Bargaining Game with Incomplete
Information, in Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining ed by A.Roth, Cambridge
University Press (1985), 99-114. pdf
4. The Nash Bargaining Solution in
Economic Modeling, with K.Binmore and A.Wolinsky, The Rand Journal of Economics
17 (1986), 176-188. pdf
5. A Sequential Strategic Theory of
Bargaining, in Advances in Economic Theory, ed. by T Bewley, Cambridge
Press (1987), 197-224. pdf
6. On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution,
with Z.Safra and W.Thomson, Econometrica, 60 (1992), 1171-1186. pdf
7. Noncooperative Bargaining Models, with K.Binmore
and M.Osborne, Handbook of Game Theory, (Aumann and Hart editors),
(1992), 179-225. pdf
8. On the Interpretation of Two Game Theoretical Models of
Bargaining, in Arrow,K., Mnookin,R., Ross,L. Tversky,A. and R.Wilson (eds.)
Barriers to Conflict Resolution, Norton, 1995, 120-130. pdf
[French: À propos de la lecture de deux modèles théoriques de négociation
», Négociations, 2012/1 n° 17, p. 23-33.]
G3. Bargaining and Markets
1. Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining, with
A.Wolinsky, Econometrica 53 (1985), 1133-1150. pdf
2. Middlemen, with A.Wolinsky, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 102 (1987), 581-594. pdf
3. Competitive Equilibrium in a Market with Decentralized Trade
and Strategic Behavior: An Introduction, in The Economics of Imperfect Competition
and Employment: Joan Robinson and Beyond, G Feiwel (editor), (1989) 243-259.
pdf
4. Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behavior and the Walrasian Outcome, with
A.Wolinsky, Review of Economic Studies 57 (1990), 63-78. pdf
G5. Common Knowledge
1. The Electronic Mail Game: A Game with Almost Common Knowledge,
American Economic Review 79 (1989), 385-391. pdf
2. On the Logic of “Agreeing to
Disagree” Type Results, with A.Wolinsky, Journal of Economic Theory
51 (1990), 184-193. pdf
3. Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium:
Between Nash and Rationalizability, with A.Wolinsky, Games and Economic
Behavior, 6 (1994), 299-311. pdf
4. An Extensive Game as a Guide for Solving a Normal Game,
with Jacob Glazer, Journal of Economic Theory, 70 (1996), 32-42. pdf
G6. Other Game Theory
1. Reputation and Patience in the War of Attrition, with L.Kornhauser
and C.Wilson, Economica 56 (1989), 15-24. pdf
2. Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences, with A.Wolinsky,
American Economic Review, 82 (1992), 600-614. pdf
3. Strategic Tournaments, with Ayala Arad. American
Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5 (2013), 31-54. pdf
4. Multi-dimensional Reasoning in Games: Framework, Equilibrium and Applications,
with Ayala Arad, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
11 (2019), 285-318. pdf
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Bounded Rationality
BR0. General
"Modeling Bounded Rationality in Economic Theory: Four Examples"
in Routledge Handbook of Bounded Rationality, edited by Riccardo Viale, Routledge
(2021), 423-435.
pdf
BR1. Finite Automatae
1. Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, Journal of Economic
Theory 39 (1986), 83-96. pdf
2. The Complexity of Strategies
and the Resolution of Conflict: An Introduction, in Global Macroeconomics:
Policy Conflict and Cooperation, Bryant and Portes (editors), MacMillan
Press (1987), 17-32. pdf
3. The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata,
with D.Abreu, Econometrica 56 (1988), 1259-1282. pdf
4. Finite Automata Play a Repeated Extensive Game, with M.Piccione,
Journal of Economic Theory, 61 (1993), 160-168. pdf
BR2. Procedures of choice
1. Definable
Preferences: An Example, European Economic Review, 42 (1998), 553-560.
pdf
2. Similarity and Decision-Making Under Risk, Journal of
Economic Theory, 46 (1988), 145-153.pdf
3. Why are certain Properties of Binary relations Relatively More Common in
Natural Language?, Econometrica, 64 (1996), 343-356. pdf
4. Definable Preferences: Another Example (Searching for a Boyfriend in a Foreign
Town) |in "The Scope of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science",
Proceedings of the 11th International Congress of Logic, Ed. by Peter
Gardenfors, et al. Kluwer, 2002, vol I, 235-243. pdf
[See Center of Research in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory, Research
Memorndum No. 31, January 1978.]
5. Rationalizing Choice Functions by Mutltiple Rationales,
with Gil Kalai and Rani Spiegler, Econometrica, 70(2002), 2481-2488.
pdf
6. "Economics and Psychology"?
The Case of Hyperbolic Discounting, International Economic Review 44
(2003), 1207-1216. pdf
- 7. A Model of Choice from Lists, with Yuval Salant, Theoretical
Economics, 1 (2006), 3-17. pdf
8. (A,f), Choice with Frames, with Yuval Salant. Review of
Economic Studies, 75 (2008), 1287-1296. pdf
9. Eliciting Welfare Preferences from Behavioral Datasets, with
Yuval Salant. Review of Economic Studies, 79 (2012), 375-387. pdf
BR3. Economic Models with Bounded Rationality
1. New Directions in Economic Theory - Bounded Rationality Revista
Espanola De Economie 7 (1990), 3-15. pdf
2. On Price Recognition and Computational
Complexity in a Monopolistic Model, Journal of Political Economy, 101
(1993), 473-484. pdf
3. A Simple Model of Equilibrium in Search Procedures, with
C.Fershtman, Journal of Economic Theory, 72 (1997), 432-441. pdf
4. Modeling the Economic Interaction of Agents with Diverse
Abilities to Recognize Equilibrium Patterns, with Michele Piccione, Journal
of European Economic Association , 1 (2003), 212-223. pdf
- 5. Money Pumps in the Market, with Rani Spiegler. Journal
of European Economics Review, 6 (2008), 237–253. pdf
6. A Model of Boundedly Rational "Neuro" Agents, with
Kfir Eliaz, Economic Theory, 57 (2014), 515-528. pdf
7. Competition for the attention of a "problem solver", with Jacob
Glazer. pdf
8. Coordinating with a "Problem Solver", with Jacob Glazer. Management
Science 65 (2019), 2813–2819.
BR4. Imperfect Recall
1. On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect
Recall, with M.Piccione, Games and Economic Behavior 20 (1997), 3-24.
pdf
2. The Absent Minded Driver's Paradox: Synthesis and
Responses, with M.Piccione, Games and Economic Behavior 20 (1997), 121-130.pdf
BR5. S-1 Equilibrium
1. Games with Procedurally Rational Players, with M.Osborne,
American Economic Review 88 (1998), 834-847. pdf
2. Sampling Equilibrium with an Application to Strategic Voting,
with Martin Osborne, Games and Economic Behavior, 45 (2003), 434-441.
pdf
BR6. Bounded Rationality and Persuasion
- 1. A Model of Persuasion with a Boundedly Rational Agent, with Jacob Glazer.
Journal of Political Economy, 120 (2012), 1057-1082. pdf
2. Complex Questionnaires, with Jacob Glazer, Econometrica, 82 (2014),
1529-1541. pdf
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Choice Theory
C1. Individual Choice
(see also Procedures of Choice)
- 1. Time Preference, with P.Fishburn, International Economic
Review 23 (1982), 677-694. pdf
-
- 2. Choice Problems with a "Reference"
Point, with L. Zhou, Mathematics of Social Sciences, 37 (1999), 205-210.
pdf
- 3. Some Thoughts on the Principle of Revealed Preference,
with Yuval Salant, in The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics:
A Handbook, Eds. A.Caplin and A.Schotter, 2008, 115-124, New York: Oxford
Univeristy Press. pdf
4. Choosing the Two Finalists,
with Kfir Eliaz and Michael Richter. Economic Theory, 46 (2011), 211-219.
pdf
5. On the Likelihood of Cyclic Comparisons,
with Uzi Segal. Journal of Economic Theory, 147 (2012), 2483-2491.
pdf
-
- 6. "Convex Preferences":
a new definition, with Michael Richter. Theoretical Economics,
14 (2019), 1169-1183. pdf
7. Story Builders, with Jacob Glazer. Journal
of Economic Theory. Volume 193 (April 2021), article 105211. pdf
C2. Social
Choice
1. A note About the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies
Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule, Econometrica 47 (1979), 511-514.
pdf
2. Ranking the Participants in a Tournament, SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics. 38 (1980), 108-111. pdf
3. Stability of Decision Under Majority Rule, Journal of
Economic Theory 23 (1980), 150-159. pdf
4. A Further Characterization of the Scores Method for Multi-Round
Tournaments and Social Theory, with S.Nitzan, Public Choice 36 (1981),
153-158. pdf
5. The Single Profile Analogies to Multi Profile Theorems:
Mathematical Logic's Approach, International Economic Review 25 (1984),
719-730. pdf
6. Algebraic Aggregation Theory, with P.C.Fishburn, Journal
of Economic Theory 38 (1986), 63-77. pdf
7.
Aggregation of Equivalence Relations, with P.C.Fishburn, Journal of Classification
3 (1986), 61-65. pdf
8. On the Question "Who is a
J?": A Social Choice Approach, with A.Kasher, Logique et Analyse 160
(1997), 385-395. pdf
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Economics
Eco1. Economic Equilibrium without Prices and without
Games
1. Equilibrium in the Jungle, with Michele Piccione, Economic
Journal, 117 (2007), 883-896. pdf
2. The Curse of Wealth and Power, with Michele Piccione, Journal of Economic
Theory ,117 (2004), 119-123. pdf
3. Luxury Prices: An Expository Note, with Michele Piccione,
Japanese Economic Review, 59 (2008), 127-132. pdf
4. Back to Fundamentals: Equilibrium in Abstract Economies, with
Michael Richter, Americn Economic Review, 105 (2015), 2570-2594. pdf
5. The Permissible and the Forbidden, with Michael Richter. Journal
of Economic Theory , 188 (July 2020), article 105042. pdf
6. Holding a group together: non-game-theory vs. game-theory, with Michael
Richter, Economic Journal 131 (2021), 2629–2641. pdf
7. Biased Preferences Equilibrium, with Asher Wolinsky. Economics and Philosophy
38 (2022), 24-33. pdf
- 8. Equilibrium in a Civilized Jungle, with Kemal Yildiz. Theoretical
Economics, 17 (2022), 943-953. pdf
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- 9.
An étude in modeling the definability of equilibrium, with Kemal Yildiz.
Review of Economic Design, 26 (2022), 543-552. pdf
10. Unilateral Stability in Matching Problems, with Michael
Richter. Journal of Economic Theory, 216 (2024), 105780. pdf,
on
line
Eco2. Behavioral Economics
1. Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to
Elicit Opinions, with Jacob Glazer, Journal of Economic Theory, 79 (1998),
157-173. pdf
2. Comments on Behavioral Economics, in Advances in Economic
Theory (2005 World Congress of the Econometric Society), Edited by R. Blundell,
W.K. Newey and T. Persson, Cambridge University Press, 2006, vol II, 246-254.
pdf or pdf
3. The People's Perspective on Libertarian-Paternalistic Policies,
with Ayala Arad. Journal of Law and Economics, 61 (2018), 311-333. pdf
4. Failing to correctly aggregate signals, with Michele Piccione.
pdf
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Eco3. Economics and Langugae (Persuasion)
1. Debates and Decisions, On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules,
with Jacob Glazer, Games and Economic Behavior, 36 (2001), 158-173. pdf
2. On Optimal Rules of Persuasion, with Jacob Glazer,
Econometrica, 72 (2004), 1715-1736. pdf
3. A Game Theoretic Approach to the Pragmatics of Debates:
An Expository Note, with Jacob Glazer, in Game Theory and Pragmatics,
Ed. By Anton Benz, Gerhard Jaeger, and Robert van Rooij. 2005, 251-265. Palgrave
MacMillan. pdf
4. A Study in
the Pragmatics of Persuasion: A Game Theoretical Approach, with Jacob Glazer,
Theoretical Economics, 1 (2006), 395-410. pdf
(Reprinted in New Perspectives on Games and Interaction, K.EApt and R.van Rooij
(eds.) Amsterdam Univeristy Press, 2008).
Eco4. Law and Economics
1. A Note on the Duty of Disclosure, Economics Letters
4 (1979), 7-11. pdf
2. False Probabilistic Arguments
vs. Faulty Intuition, Israel Law Review 14 (1979), 247-254. pdf
3.. On
An Anomaly of the Deterrent Effect of Punishment, Economics Letters 6
(1980), 89-94. pdf
4. The Reasonable Man - A Social Choice Approach, Theory
and Decision 15 (1983), 151-159. pdf
5. A Sequential Concession Game with Asymmetric Information, with J.Ordover,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 101 (1986), 879-888. pdf
6. Optimal Flexibility of Rules: The
Tale of the Wise Principal and the Naive Agent, European Journal of Political
Economics 5 (1989) 219-227. pdf
Eco5. Didactic
1. A Sceptic's Comment on the Study of Economics, Economic
Journal, 116 (2006), C1-C9. pdf
2. Freak-Freakonomics, The Economists' Voice : Vol. 3 (2007):
Iss. 9, Article 7. pdf. Published
in Hebrew in Haaretz, July 2006.
3. 10 Q&A: Experienced advice for “lost”
graduate students in Economics. Journal of Economic Eduation, 44 (2013), 193-196.
pdf
Econ7. Interpretation of Economic Theory
1. Comments on the Interpretation
of Game Theory, Econometrica 59 (1991), 909-924. pdf
2. A Subjective Perspective of the Interpretation of Economic
Theory, in Making Modern Economics, The Makers of Modern Economics, vol
I, A.Heertje. (Ed.) (1993), 67-83. pdf
3. Dilemmas of An Economic Theorist,
Econometrica, 74 (2006), 865-883 pdf.
(A Spanish translation: Refits De Economia Institucional,
8 (2006), 191-213)
4. "Afterword", in the 60th anniversary edition
of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by Oskar Morgenstern and John
Von Neumann, Princeton University Press, 2004. pdf.
5. Interview in Game Theory: 5 Questions, edited by V.F.Hendricks
and P. Gukdborg Hansen, Automatic Press / VIP, 2007. pdf.
6. Comments on Economic Models, Economics and Economists: Remarks on Economics
Rules by Dani Rodrik. Journal of Economic Literature, 55 (2017), 162-172.
pdf
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Exp. Experimental Economics
Exp1. Experiemntal GameTheory and Choice
Theory
1. Naive Strategies in Competitive Games, with A.Tversky and
D.Heller, in Understanding Strategic Interaction - Essays in Honor of Reinhard
Selten, W.Guth et al. (editors), Springer-Verlag, 1996, 394-402.pdf
2. Experience from a Course in Game Theory: Pre and Post-class Problem Sets
as a Didactic Device, Games and Economic Behavior 28 (1999), 155-170.pdf
( Better see an extended "Second Edition"
)
3. A Theorist's View of Experiments, European Economic Review 45 (2001),
615-628. pdf
4. Irrational Diversification in Multiple
Decision Problems, European Economic Review, 46 (2002), 1369-1378. pdf
5. Edgar Allan Poe's Riddle: Do Guessers Outperform Misleaders
in a Repeated Matching Pennies Game? , with Kfir Eliaz. Games and Economic
Behavior, 71 (2011), 88-99. pdf
6. The 11-20 Money Request Game: A Level-k Reasoning Study,
with Ayala Arad. American Economic Review, 102 (2012), 3561-3573. pdf
7. Multi-Dimensional Iterative Reasoning in Action: The
Case of the Colonel Blotto Game, with Ayala Arad. Journal
of Economic Behavior & Organization, 84 (2012), 571-585. pdf
8. On Fairness of Random Procedures, with Kfir Eliaz. Economics Letters,
123 (2014), 168–170. pdf
9. Isn't everyone like me?": On the presence of self-similarity
in strategic interactions, with Yuval Salant. Judgement and
Decision Making, 11 (2016), 168-173. pdf
10. People Making Predictions Based on Data: Holistic and Atomistic Procedures,
with Jacob Glazer. Journal of Economic Theory, 216 (2024), 105791.
pdf, on
line
Exp2. Response Time
1. Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: A Study of Response
Times, Economic Journal, 117 (2007), 1243-1259. pdf
2. Comments on NeuroEconomics. Economics and Philosophy,
24 (2008), 485-494. pdf
French: review francaise d'economie, 23 (2009), 159-174.
3. Tracking Decision Makers under Uncertainty, with Amos
Arieli and Yaniv Ben-Ami. American Economic Joutnal - Microeconomics,
3 (2011), 68-76. pdf
4. Response Time and Decision Making: A "Free" Experimental
Study. Judgement and Decision Making, 8 (2013), 540-551. pdf
(full version: pdf)
[See also pdf pdf
pdf]
5. A Typology of Players: between Instinctive and Contemplative,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131 (2016): 859-890. pdf
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