Ariel Rubinstein
Sorted List of Publications:      

(Full Vitae)


  1. Bargaining and Markets, with Martin Osborne, Academic Press, 1990.  

  2. A Course in Game Theory, with Martin Osborne, MIT Press, 1994.

  3. Modeling Bounded Rationality, MIT Press, 1998.

  4. Economics and Language, Cambridge University Press, 2000.  

  5. Lecture Notes in Microeconomics (modeling the economic agent), Princeton University Press, 2005.

  6. Economic Fables (Eng.), Open Book Publishers, 2012.
Game Theory Bounded Rationality Choice Theory Economics Experimental
Repeated Games Finite Automata Individual Choice Equilibrium (Jungle and competitive) Exp. Game and Choice Theory
Bargaining Procedures of Choice Social Choice Behavioral Economics Response Time
Bargaining and Markets Economic Models with BR   Economics and Language (persuasion)  
Common Knowledge Imperfect Recall   Law and Economics  
Other Game Theory S-1 Equilibrium   Didactic  
  Bounded Rationality and Persuasion   Interpretation of Economic Theory  


Game Theory

G1. Repeated Games

1. Equilibrium in Supergames with the Overtaking Criterion Journal of Economic Theory 21 (1979), 1-9. pdf

2. An Optimal Policy for Offenses that May Have Been Committed By Accident in Applied Game Theory, ed. by S Brams, A Schotter and G Schwodiauer, Wurzberg: Physica-Verlag (1979), 406-413. pdf

3. Strong Perfect Equilibrium in Supergames, International Journal of Game Theory 9 (1980), 1-12. pdf

4. Repeated Insurance Contracts and Moral Hazard, with M.E.Yaari, Journal of Economic Theory 30 (1983), 74-97.pdf

5. Repeated Two Players Game with Ruin, with R.Rosenthal, International Journal of Game Theory 14 (1984), 155-177. pdf

6. Equilibrium in Supergames in Essay in Game theory in honor of Michael Maschler, N.Meggiddo (ed.) Springer-Verlag, 1994, 17-28. pdf original discussion paper(1977)

7. Remarks on Repeated Extensive Games, with A.Wolinsky, Games and Economic Behavior, 9(1995), 110-115. pdf 


G2. Bargaining

1. Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, Econometrica 50 (1982), 97-110. pdf 

2. A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information about Time Preferences, Econometrica 53 (1985), 1151-1172. pdf 

3. Choice of Conjectures in a Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information, in Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining ed by A.Roth, Cambridge University Press (1985), 99-114. pdf

4. The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling, with K.Binmore and A.Wolinsky, The Rand Journal of Economics 17 (1986), 176-188. pdf

5. A Sequential Strategic Theory of Bargaining, in Advances in Economic Theory, ed. by T Bewley, Cambridge Press (1987), 197-224. pdf

6. On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution, with Z.Safra and W.Thomson, Econometrica, 60 (1992), 1171-1186. pdf

7. Noncooperative Bargaining Models, with K.Binmore and M.Osborne, Handbook of Game Theory, (Aumann and Hart editors), (1992), 179-225. pdf

8. On the Interpretation of Two Game Theoretical Models of Bargaining, in Arrow,K., Mnookin,R., Ross,L. Tversky,A. and R.Wilson (eds.) Barriers to Conflict Resolution, Norton, 1995, 120-130. pdf 
[French: À propos de la lecture de deux modèles théoriques de négociation », Négociations, 2012/1 n° 17, p. 23-33.]


G3. Bargaining and Markets

1. Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining, with A.Wolinsky, Econometrica 53 (1985), 1133-1150. pdf

2. Middlemen, with A.Wolinsky, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102 (1987), 581-594. pdf

3. Competitive Equilibrium in a Market with Decentralized Trade and Strategic Behavior: An Introduction, in The Economics of Imperfect Competition and Employment: Joan Robinson and Beyond, G Feiwel (editor), (1989) 243-259. pdf

4. Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behavior and the Walrasian Outcome, with A.Wolinsky, Review of Economic Studies 57 (1990), 63-78. pdf


G5. Common Knowledge

1. The Electronic Mail Game: A Game with Almost Common Knowledge, American Economic Review 79 (1989), 385-391. pdf 

2. On the Logic of “Agreeing to Disagree” Type Results, with A.Wolinsky, Journal of Economic Theory 51 (1990), 184-193. pdf

3. Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability, with A.Wolinsky, Games and Economic Behavior, 6 (1994), 299-311. pdf

4. An Extensive Game as a Guide for Solving a Normal Game, with Jacob Glazer, Journal of Economic Theory, 70 (1996), 32-42. pdf 


G6. Other Game Theory

1. Reputation and Patience in the War of Attrition, with L.Kornhauser and C.Wilson, Economica 56 (1989), 15-24. pdf

2. Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences, with A.Wolinsky, American Economic Review, 82 (1992), 600-614. pdf

3. Strategic Tournaments, with Ayala Arad.  American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5 (2013), 31-54. pdf

4. Multi-dimensional Reasoning in Games: Framework, Equilibrium and Applications, with Ayala Arad. pdf




Bounded Rationality

BR1. Finite Automatae

1. Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, Journal of Economic Theory 39 (1986), 83-96. pdf

2. The Complexity of Strategies and the Resolution of Conflict: An Introduction, in Global Macroeconomics: Policy Conflict and Cooperation, Bryant and Portes (editors), MacMillan Press (1987), 17-32. pdf

3. The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata, with D.Abreu, Econometrica 56 (1988), 1259-1282. pdf

4. Finite Automata Play a Repeated Extensive Game, with M.Piccione, Journal of Economic Theory, 61 (1993), 160-168. pdf


BR2. Procedures of choice

1. Definable Preferences: An Example, European Economic Review, 42 (1998), 553-560. pdf

2. Similarity and Decision-Making Under Risk, Journal of Economic Theory, 46 (1988), 145-153.pdf

3. Why are certain Properties of Binary relations Relatively More Common in Natural Language?, Econometrica, 64 (1996), 343-356. pdf 

4. Definable Preferences: Another Example (Searching for a Boyfriend in a Foreign Town) |in "The Scope of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science", Proceedings of the 11th International Congress of Logic, Ed. by Peter Gardenfors, et al. Kluwer, 2002, vol I, 235-243. pdf

[See Center of Research in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory, Research Memorndum No. 31, January 1978.]

5. Rationalizing Choice Functions by Mutltiple Rationales, with Gil Kalai and Rani Spiegler, Econometrica, 70(2002), 2481-2488. pdf

6. "Economics and Psychology"? The Case of Hyperbolic Discounting, International Economic Review 44 (2003), 1207-1216. pdf

7. A Model of Choice from Lists, with Yuval Salant, Theoretical Economics, 1 (2006), 3-17. pdf

8. (A,f), Choice with Frames, with Yuval Salant. Review of Economic Studies, 75 (2008), 1287-1296. pdf

9. Eliciting Welfare Preferences from Behavioral Datasets, with Yuval Salant. Review of Economic Studies, 79 (2012), 375-387. pdf

BR3. Economic Models with Bounded Rationality

1. New Directions in Economic Theory - Bounded Rationality Revista Espanola De Economie 7 (1990), 3-15. pdf

2. On Price Recognition and Computational Complexity in a Monopolistic Model, Journal of Political Economy, 101 (1993), 473-484. pdf 

3. A Simple Model of Equilibrium in Search Procedures, with C.Fershtman, Journal of Economic Theory, 72 (1997), 432-441. pdf

4. Modeling the Economic Interaction of Agents with Diverse Abilities to Recognize Equilibrium Patterns, with Michele Piccione, Journal of European Economic Association , 1 (2003), 212-223. pdf

5. Money Pumps in the Market, with Rani Spiegler. Journal of European Economics Review, 6 (2008), 237–253. pdf

6. A Model of Boundedly Rational "Neuro" Agents, with Kfir Eliaz, Economic Theory, 57 (2014), 515-528. pdf

7. Competition for the attention of a "problem solver", with Jacob Glazer. pdf


BR4. Imperfect Recall

1. On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall, with M.Piccione, Games and Economic Behavior 20 (1997), 3-24. pdf

The Absent Minded Driver's Paradox: Synthesis and Responses, with M.Piccione, Games and Economic Behavior 20 (1997), 121-130.pdf


BR5. S-1 Equilibrium

1. Games with Procedurally Rational Players, with M.Osborne, American Economic Review 88 (1998), 834-847. pdf 

2. Sampling Equilibrium with an Application to Strategic Voting, with Martin Osborne, Games and Economic Behavior, 45 (2003), 434-441. pdf


BR6. Bounded Rationality and Persuasion

1. A Model of Persuasion with a Boundedly Rational Agent, with Jacob Glazer. Journal of Political Economy, 120 (2012), 1057-1082. pdf

2. Complex Questionnaires, with Jacob Glazer, Econometrica, 82 (2014), 1529-1541. pdf



Choice Theory

C1. Individual Choice (see also Procedures of Choice)

1. Time Preference, with P.Fishburn, International Economic Review 23 (1982), 677-694. pdf
2. Choice Problems with a "Reference" Point, with L. Zhou, Mathematics of Social Sciences, 37 (1999), 205-210. pdf
3. Some Thoughts on the Principle of Revealed Preference, with Yuval Salant, in The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics: A Handbook, Eds. A.Caplin and A.Schotter, 2008, 115-124, New York: Oxford Univeristy Press. pdf

4. Choosing the Two Finalists, with Kfir Eliaz and Michael Richter. Economic Theory, 46 (2011), 211-219. pdf

5. On the Likelihood of Cyclic Comparisons, with Uzi Segal. Journal of Economic Theory, 147 (2012), 2483-2491. pdf

C2. Social Choice

1. A note About the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule, Econometrica 47 (1979), 511-514. pdf

2. Ranking the Participants in a Tournament, Journal of the Society of Industrial and Applied Mathematics 38 (1980), 108-111. pdf 

3. Stability of Decision Under Majority Rule, Journal of Economic Theory 23 (1980), 150-159. pdf

4. A Further Characterization of the Scores Method for Multi-Round Tournaments and Social Theory, with S.Nitzan, Public Choice 36 (1981), 153-158. pdf
5. The Single Profile Analogies to Multi Profile Theorems: Mathematical Logic's Approach, International Economic Review 25 (1984), 719-730. pdf
6. Algebraic Aggregation Theory, with P.C.Fishburn, Journal of Economic Theory 38 (1986), 63-77. pdf

7. Aggregation of Equivalence Relations, with P.C.Fishburn, Journal of Classification 3 (1986), 61-65. pdf
8. On the Question "Who is a J?": A Social Choice Approach, with A.Kasher, Logique et Analyse 160 (1997), 385-395. pdf


Eco1. Economic Equilibrium

1. Equilibrium in the Jungle, with Michele Piccione, Economic Journal, 117 (2007), 883-896. pdf

2. The Curse of Wealth and Power, with Michele Piccione, Journal of Economic Theory ,117 (2004), 119-123. pdf

3. 4. Luxury Prices: An Expository Note, with Michele Piccione, Japanese Economic Review, 59 (2008), 127-132. pdf

4. Back to Fundamentals: Convex Geometry and Economic Equilibrium, with Michael Richter, Americn Economic Review, 105 (2015), 2570-2594. pdf


Eco2. Behavioral Economics

1. Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions, with Jacob Glazer, Journal of Economic Theory, 79 (1998), 157-173. pdf

2. Comments on Behavioral Economics, in Advances in Economic Theory (2005 World Congress of the Econometric Society), Edited by R. Blundell, W.K. Newey and T. Persson, Cambridge University Press, 2006, vol II, 246-254. pdf or pdf

3. The People's Perspective on Libertarian-Paternalistic Policies, with Ayala Arad. pdf


Eco3. Economics and Langugae (Persuasion)

1. Debates and Decisions, On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules, with Jacob Glazer, Games and Economic Behavior, 36 (2001), 158-173. pdf

2. On Optimal Rules of Persuasion, with Jacob Glazer, Econometrica, 72 (2004), 1715-1736. pdf

3. A Game Theoretic Approach to the Pragmatics of Debates: An Expository Note, with Jacob Glazer, in Game Theory and Pragmatics, Ed. By Anton Benz, Gerhard Jaeger, and Robert van Rooij. 2005, 251-265. Palgrave MacMillan. pdf
4. A Study in the Pragmatics of Persuasion: A Game Theoretical Approach, with Jacob Glazer, Theoretical Economics, 1 (2006), 395-410. pdf
(Reprinted in New Perspectives on Games and Interaction, K.EApt and R.van Rooij (eds.) Amsterdam Univeristy Press, 2008).

Eco4. Law and Economics
1. A Note on the Duty of Disclosure, Economic Letters 4 (1979), 7-11. pdf  

2. False Probabilistic Arguments vs. Faulty Intuition, Israel Law Review 14 (1979), 247-254. pdf   html
3.. On An Anomaly of the Deterrent Effect of Punishment, Economic Letters 6 (1980), 89-94. pdf
4. The Reasonable Man - A Social Choice Approach, Theory and Decision 15 (1983), 151-159. pdf

5. A Sequential Concession Game with Asymmetric Information, with J.Ordover, Quarterly Journal of Economics 101 (1986), 879-888. pdf

6. Optimal Flexibility of Rules: The Tale of the Wise Principal and the Naive Agent, European Journal of Political Economics 5 (1989) 219-227. pdf

Eco5. Didactic

1. A Skeptic Comment on the Studies of Economics, Economic Journal, 116 (2006), C1-C9. pdf
2. Freak-Freakonomics, The Economists' Voice : Vol. 3 (2007): Iss. 9, Article 7. pdf.    Published in Hebrew in Haaretz, July 2006.

3. 10 Q&A: Experienced advice for “lost” graduate students in Economics. Journal of Economic Eduation, 44 (2013), 193-196. pdf
Econ7. Interpretation of Economic Theory

1. Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory, Econometrica 59 (1991), 909-924. pdf

2. A Subjective Perspective of the Interpretation of Economic Theory, in Making Modern Economics, The Makers of Modern Economics, vol I, A.Heertje. (Ed.) (1993), 67-83. pdf

3. Dilemmas of An Economic Theorist, Econometrica, 74 (2006), 865-883 pdf.
(A Spanish translation: Refits De Economia Institucional, 8 (2006), 191-213)

"Afterword", in the 60th anniversary edition of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by Oskar Morgenstern and John Von Neumann, Princeton University Press, 2004. pdf.

5. Interview in Game Theory: 5 Questions, edited by V.F.Hendricks and P. Gukdborg Hansen, Automatic Press / VIP, 2007. pdf.

6. Comments on Economic Models, Economics and Economists: Remarks on Economics Rules by Dani Rodrik. Journal of Economic Literature, 55 (2017), 162-172. pdf



Exp. Experimental Economics

Exp1. Experiemntal "Game and Choice Theory"

1. Naive Strategies in Competitive Games, with A.Tversky and D.Heller, in Understanding Strategic Interaction - Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten, W.Guth et al. (editors), Springer-Verlag, 1996, 394-402.pdf

2. Experience from a Course in Game Theory: Pre and Post-class Problem Sets as a Didactic Device, Games and Economic Behavior 28 (1999), 155-170.pdf  ( Better see an extended "Second Edition" )

3. A Theorist's View of Experiments, European Economic Review 45 (2001), 615-628. pdf

4. Irrational Diversification in Multiple Decision Problems, European Economic Review, 46 (2002), 1369-1378. pdf 

5. Edgar Allan Poe's Riddle: Do Guessers Outperform Misleaders in a Repeated Matching Pennies Game? , with Kfir Eliaz. Games and Economic Behavior71 (2011), 88-99. pdf

6. The 11-20 Money Request Game: A Level-k Reasoning Study, with Ayala Arad. American Economic Review, 102 (2012), 3561-3573. pdf

7. Multi-Dimensional Iterative Reasoning in Action: The Case of the Colonel Blotto Game, with Ayala Arad. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 84 (2012), 571-585. pdf

8. On Fairness of Random Procedures, with Kfir Eliaz. Economic Letters, 123 (2014), 168–170. pdf

9. Isn't everyone like me?": On the presence of self-similarity in strategic interactions, with Yuval Salant. Judgement and Decision Making, 11 (2016), 168-173. pdf


Exp2. Response Time

1. Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: A Study of Response Times, Economic Journal, 117 (2007), 1243-1259. pdf

2. Comments on NeuroEconomics. Economics and Philosophy, 24 (2008), 485-494. pdf
French: review francaise d'economie, 23 (2009), 159-174.

3. Tracking Decision Makers under Uncertainty, with Amos Arieli and Yaniv Ben-Ami. American Economic Joutnal - Microeconomics, 3 (2011), 68-76. pdf

4. Response Time and Decision Making: A "Free" Experimental Study. Judgement and Decision Making, 8 (2013), 540-551. pdf  (full version: pdf)

[See also pdf pdf pdf]

5. A Typology of Players: between Instinctive and Contemplative, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131 (2016): 859-890. pdf